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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Water Requirementsfor Energy Development

The petroleum shortages of the early 1970's have focused attention
on the nation's potential for developing alternate sources of fuel. The
western states contain much of the mineral resources necessary for such
development. One of the richest sources of coal is the Fort Union formation in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. The states of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico also have significant coal

deposits.'
Alternative energy technologies such as oil shale development,

coal gasification, and coal liquefaction have also received increased attention.2 President Carter proposed subsidizing synthetic fuels devel-

opment, which resulted in the establishment of the Synthetic Fuels
Corporation by the Energy Security Act of 1980. 3 The richest oil shale
1. C. BoRIs & J. KRUTILLA, WATER RIGHTS AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE YELLOW1-4 (1980); OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COLO. DEP'T OF NATURAL

STONE RIVER BASIN

RESOURCES, THE AVAILABILITY OF WATER FOR OIL SHALE AND COAL GASIFICATION DEVELOPMENT IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 2-10, 2-11 (Oct. 1979) (draft of summary report
prepared for the U.S. Water Resources Council) [hereinafter cited as UPPER COLORADO BASIN

STUDY].
2. For a sample of the types of studies being done for the federal government on the development of synthetic fuels, see UPPER COLORADO BASIN STUDY, supra note 1; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT,

U.S.

CONGRESS,

A

TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT

OF

COAL

SLURRY

PIPELINES (Mar. 1978) [hereinafter cited as COAL SLURRY PIPELINES]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
IMPACTS, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SYNTHETIC FUELS AND THE ENVIRONMENT. AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY IMPACTS ANALYSIS (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as SYNTHETIC FU-

ELS]; OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTALLY BASED

SITING ASSESSMENT FOR SYNTHETIC LIQUID FUELS FACILITIES (Jan. 1980) (draft of final report)
[hereinafter cited as LIQUID FUELS]; SCIENCE AND PUB. POLICY PROGRAM, UNIV. OF OKLA., EN-

ERGY ALTERNATIVES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (May, 1975) (prepared for various federal
agencies).
3. United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8795 (Supp.
IV 1980). The Synthetic Fuels Corporation is authorized to appropriate billions of dollars as loan
guarantees, price guarantees, and purchase agreements for synthetic fuels in order to encourage
commercial investment in these relatively new and untried technologies. Other potential sources
of funding are the Non-Nuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5902, 5906, 5907 (Supp. IV 1980) and the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 20612169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). It appears that pursuant to these Acts, the proposed gasification
plant of the American Natural Gas Coal Gasification Company in western North Dakota and the
Union Oil Company oil shale venture in western Colorado will receive loan guarantees. The
Colony Oil Shale venture in western Colorado was due to receive price guarantees, but it appears
that this project will not be completed. Some Setbacksfor Synfuels, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 67;
Exxon Pulls Out Of $5 Billion Oil Shale Project, Wash. Post, May 3, 1982, at AI.
Due to the free-enterprise bias of the Reagan administration, especially that of the new chairman of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, Edward E. Noble, the federal government will severely
restrict its aid to the industry, forcing the industry to rely more upon the private markets. See 4
free-market bias at Synfuels, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1981, at 50; The Synthetic Fuels PartyHas Gone
Flat, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1982, at A16.
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deposits in the United States are found in the Green River and White
River basins in Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado.4 The Green River formation alone is estimated to contain more than three trillion barrels of
oil equivalent.' The vast quantities of oil shale and coal in the Rocky
Mountain states have made these states the focus of policies encouraging such energy projects.6 Projects for pipelining coal slurry from the
coal regions are also being studied, and a slurry pipeline is being
planned for the transport of coal from Wyoming to Arkansas.7
Three concepts must be distinguished with regard to the water
needs of energy development. The first concept, water requirements of
an energy project, consists of the total amount of water needs, whether
the source is water withdrawn from a body of water or water generated
by the energy production or mining process itself. Coal gasification
plants, for example, may produce water from the coal itself or from the
methanation process.8 The second concept, water withdrawal, refers to
the amount of water withdrawn from a body of water to make up the
difference between the amount required and the amount produced.
The third concept, water consumption, consists of the amount of water
withdrawn less the amount discharged back into a body of water for
use by downstream appropriators.9 The relevant concept for purposes
of this Article is the amount of water which may be withdrawn from
existing water bodies to facilitate energy development. It appears that
coal gasification and oil shale projects will reuse or otherwise dispose of
their waste waters so that there will be minimal, if any, water returned
to the sources from which the water was withdrawn.' °
4. UPPER COLORADO BASIN STUDY, supra note I, at 2-7 to 2-10.
5. Id.
6. Wett, Synfuels offer challengingfuture,OIL & GAS J., June 29, 1981, at 71; UPPER COLORADO BASIN STUDY, supra note 1; Mo. RIVER BASIN COMM'N, UPPER MISSOURI RIVER BASIN
WATER AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT FOR COAL TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS (Dec. 1978) [hereinafter cited as UPPER MISSOURI BASIN STUDY]; SCIENCE AND PUB. POLICY PROGRAM, UNIV. OF
OKLA., ENERGY FROM THE WEST (Aug. 1979) (summary report, prepared for Office of Research
and Development, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency).
7. COAL SLURRY PIPELINES, supra note 2, at 27-29.
8. C. BoRIs & J. KRuTILLA, supra note 1, at 121.
9. For example, an energy project may require 10,000 acre-feet of water per year. An acrefoot of water is the quantity of water necessary to cover one acre of ground to a depth of one foot.
The production of 1000 acre-feet may result from the energy production process itself. Therefore
9000 acre-feet would be withdrawn from a water body. If, as is likely, no water is returned to the
natural water systems, 9000 acre-feet is also consumed per year. However, if 3000 acre-feet is
treated for pollutants and discharged back into the natural water systems, water consumption
would be 6000 acre-feet per year.
10. UPPER COLORADO BASIN STUDY, supra note 1, at 1-16, 9-1 to 9-9; Dempsey, Oil Shale
and Water Quality: The Colorado Prospectus Under Federal,State, and InternationalLaw, 58
DEN. LJ.715, 718-20 (1981). Boris and Krutilla have commented, "Once again, it should be
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While coal mining does not require withdrawal of much water,' l
alternative energy technologies may require withdrawal of large quantities. It is estimated that a coal gasification plant producing 250 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) could require the withdrawal of
about 6,000 acre-feet of water per year. 12 A 50,000 barrel per day
(bbl/d) oil shale venture is estimated to consume between 5,000 and
8,000 acre-feet of water per year.' 3 The coal slurry pipeline being built
by Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. (ETSI) will require upwards of
20,000 acre-feet of water per year to be taken primarily from the Lake
4
Oahe Reservoir on the Missouri River in South Dakota.1
Commercial oil shale, coal gasification, and coal liquefaction ventures are still in the planning stages. The energy use currently requiring the largest quantity of water in this region is the generation of
electricity by large steam electric plants.'" Power plants which are currently in the planning or construction stages may use the most water
consumptive cooling processes--cooling ponds and wet-cooling towers.
This is necessitated by environmental concerns. The early estimates of
noted that the raw water intake requirement is entirely consumptive; that is, no water is returned
as liquid to the water supply source." C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 1, at 121 (footnote
omitted).
11. C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 1, at 98-104. The study estimates water use for a
hypothetical mine producing 10 million tons of coal per year and operating 250 days per year as
being 500 acre-feet per year, most of which will come from mine dewatering. Since groundwater
and surface water are hydrologically interrelated, this estimate is considered the upper bound of
surface water depletion. However, coal mining may have adverse environmental effects, affecting
the rights of downstream users by altering water hydrology and causing deterioration of water
quality. See Israel, Emerging Federaland State Water ConflictsAffecting Western Coal Development, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 157 (1980).
12. C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 1, at 121. The American Natural Gas Coal Gasification Company is planning to build a 125 MMcf/d plant in North Dakota, with a second plant of
equal size to follow if the first is successful. The El Paso and Wesco plants planned for the Four
Corners area of New Mexico, which appear to have been postponed, would have produced 410
MMcf/d and 250 MMcf/d respectively. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, WATER SUPPLY SHOULD NOT
BE AN OBSTACLE TO MEETING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT GOALS 70 (Jan. 24, 1980) (report to Con-

gress) [hereinafter cited as GAO WATER REPORT].
13. UPPER COLORADO BASIN STUDY, supra note 1, at 5-4 (citing a number of studies regarding surface retort plants). A study comparing the amount of water required less the amount of
water produced by specific oil shale plants estimates net consumption of between 5000 and 13,000
acre-feet per year for these 50,000 bbl/d plants. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, AN ASSESSMENT OF OIL SHALE TECHNOLOGIES 364 (1980). These estimates include
the water requirements of workers at the facilities, but exclude the amount of water produced by
mine dewatering which is listed separately.
14. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR (lead agency) AND WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS,

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE ENERGY

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS INC., COAL SLURRY PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION PROJECT 1-61 (July,

1981). ETSI in fact purchased 50,000 acre-feet per year from South Dakota for 50 years and may
sell the surplus. A Pipeline That Is Incitinga Water War, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1981, at 59.
15. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
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15,000 to 20,000 acre-feet per year per 1,000 megawatts (MW) for such
plants, however, may be too high. Revised calculations, based on ac-

tual use, range from 8,000 to 15,000 acre-feet per year per 1,000 MW.' 6
The water systems draining the lands containing these energy re-

sources are located in the Upper Colorado River and Upper Missouri
River Basins.' 7 The White and Green Rivers, which drain lands rich in

oil shale, are tributaries of the Colorado River. So is the San Juan
River in New Mexico which flows through lands rich in coal reserves.
The Powder, Tongue, Bighorn, and Yellowstone Rivers, which traverse

the rich coal country of southeastern Montana and northern Wyoming,
are tributaries of the Missouri River.

In the mid-1970's, commentators were concerned over impending
water shortages in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins as energy and industrial uses competed with agricultural uses' for
limited water supplies. One commentator feared that contracts between the federal government and energy companies for options of vast
supplies of water stored in Bureau of Reclamation reservoirs in Mon16. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at 8-15. Cooling ponds and wet-cooling towers are
"closed" systems and hence are environmentally preferable to once-through cooling processes
which discharge heated water back into the streams.
The wet-cooling towers and cooling ponds consume water at a higher rate than technologies
which are more harmful to the environment such as once-through cooling. The wet-cooling towers and cooling ponds consume water by evaporation and by keeping water in segregated ponds.
In contrast, a once-through system causes thermal pollution by returning heated water to the
watercourse.
Once-through cooling is discouraged by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1976), amendedby Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV 1980), and
by the lack of adequate sites for this technique. Another technology, the use of dry-cooling towers, involves little water consumption and utilizes closed systems, but is very expensive.
Boris and Krutilla estimate that 14,400 acre-feet per year may be consumed by a hypothetical
1000 MW capacity coal-fired power plant utilizing wet-cooling towers. C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA,
supra note 1, at 104-14. This estimate was based on a presumption of 100% capacity whereas the
revised GAO estimates are based on actual plants operating at much lower capacities.
17. The Upper Colorado River Basin includes western Wyoming, western Colorado, western
New Mexico, eastern Utah, and eastern Arizona. See the maps in UPPER COLORADO BASIN
STUDY, supra note I, at 2-2 to 2-4. The Upper Missouri River Basin comprises northern Wyoming, southeastern Montana, and the western Dakotas. See UPPER MissouI BASIN STUDY,
supra note 6, at 105-09.
18. See Weatherford and Jacoby, Impact ofEnergy Development on the Law of the Colorado

River, 15

NAT. RESOURCES J.

171 (1975).

Although the rural reclamation ethic has been able to accommodate a measure of municipal-industrial water and power demand in the past, the divergent, water-related demands of urban populations now have grown to a point where accommodation is
becoming more difficult. The urban-based "environmentalist" and "recreationist" demand clean water. The urban "voter" demands that limits be put on subsidies for agricultural development . . . . The urban "consumer" sustains a high-energy lifestyle
....
These often times inconsistent demands add up to an urban assault of major
proportions on the rural reclamation ethic.
Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
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tana and Wyoming would preempt Indians' rights to their share of the
water.' 9 Others pointed to the environmental consequences of the inof the Colorado River2 and pollution from energy
creasing salinity
21
processes.
Recently, commentators have concluded that there is no immediate emergency, although they also agree that a shortage will come eventually.22 The configuration of energy development in the West will be
19. Veeder, ConfiscationofIndian WintersRights in the Upper MissouriRiver Basin, 21 S.D.L.
REV. 282 (1976). The author noted the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of
the Interior and the Secretary of the Army which was designed to provide water for energy development from six main-stem Missouri reservoirs: Fort Peck in Montana; Garrison in North Dakota; Oahe, Big Bend, and Randall in South Dakota; and Gavin's Point in South Dakota and
Nebraska. Id. at 295-96 nn.45-46. See C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, supra note 1, at 66-71.
20. SYNTHETIC FUELS, supra note 2, at 5-60. Water for energy increases salinity by reducing
downstream dilution. Unlike agricultural uses, there are no automatic return flows from industrial or energy uses, which aggravates the problem. Depending on what is done with the waste
water, energy uses may create different patterns of consumption than agricultural uses.
21. See Dempsey, supra note 10.
22. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at 4. "In general, we concluded that water
shortages within the Basin are inevitable after the year 2000 but that there is time to plan for and
manage the shortage." Id., referring to COMPTROLLER GENERAL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
PROBLEMS: How To REDUCE THEIR IMPACT (1979). See Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal
Development, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 511, 516-27 (1980).
The revised estimates as to the seriousness of the problem may be due to several factors. One
may be the lower than expected annual growth of electric consumption. The historical rate of
growth is about 7%, whereas current growth is estimated at 3.7% to 4.7%. GAO WATER REPORT,
supra note 12, at 10. In addition, the increase in energy development in the West, especially oil
shale development and coal gasification, was much slower than expected. This in turn was partially due to institutional and legal uncertainties concerning water supplies. For example, energy
companies cancelled their options for hundreds of thousands of acre-feet of water from the Yellowtail Reservoir in Montana. According to the GAO's Report, the companies based the cancellations on the weak market for synthetic fuels, the inability of the companies to meet the
Department of the Interior's requirement for a detailed water development plan, and uncertainty
over the Bureau of Reclamation's rights to market the water to industrial users. Id. at 34. Another source attributes the cancellations to the companies' concern that the federal government
will not construct needed pipelines and aqueducts, as well as their concern over article 10 of the
Yellowstone River Compact, ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663, 669 (1951), which prohibits transfer of water
out of the Yellowstone subbasin without the unanimous approval of the signatory states-Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. LIQUID FUELS, supra note 2, at V-37. Another reason for the
unexpectedly slow growth in synthetic fuels development is the change in philosophy on the part
of the Reagan administration toward subsidizing synfuels development. See supra note 3.
In any case, projection of synthetic fuel production seems to have decreased. The GAO Report cites a 1974 study anticipating production of 1,515,000 bbl/d of oil shale and 2902 MMcf/d
of gasified coal in the Upper Colorado Basin by the year 2000. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note
12, at 19 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON WATER FOR ENERGY IN THE UPPER

COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1974)). The GAO Report cites the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources' estimates for the year 2000-oil shale production of 1,300,000 bbl/d and coal gasification production of 2035 MMcf/d. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at 19 (citing UPPER
COLORADO BASIN STUDY, supra note 1). The Missouri River Basin Commission anticipates production of 292,500 bbl/d of liquefied fuel and 4170 MMcf/d of gasified coal in the year 2000 in
the Upper Missouri Basin. UPPER MISSOURI BASIN STUDY, supra note 6, at 102 (addition error in
original).
The GAO Report estimates water requirements for the two Basins for the year 2000 at 91,000
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determined by the priorities of the governmental entities controlling the
water. It therefore becomes vital to determine the relative jurisdictions
of the federal government, Indian tribes, and states over the water. The
interests, however, of these governmental entities, as well as the sources
of their powers, are varied.
B.

JurisdictionalConflicts over Water

The federal government has a sovereign interest in regulating navigable waters under the commerce clause of the Constitution 23 and in

procuring water for federal properties in the West under the property
clause.24 The states determine the water rights of persons within their
borders; some states have recently undertaken environmental preserva-

tion by reserving water for instream flows. 2 - The Indian tribes have
inherent sovereignty over the reservation lands which they own. Depending upon the situation, the tribes may exercise jurisdiction over

non-Indians within reservation boundaries either alone,26 concurrently
with the states,2 or not at all.28 The tribes' interests are two-fold: ac-

quiring water for their reservation lands and regulating use by Indians
and non-Indians on reservation lands.
to 148,000 acre-feet for oil shale development and 198,960 acre-feet for coal gasification and liquefaction based upon the data of the Colorado and Missouri studies. GAO WATER REPORT, supra
note 12, at 21.
There would seem to be adequate water supplies to meet these requirements, assuming that
the projects are located properly. In order to put these numbers in perspective, note that the
Yellowtail Reservoir on the Bighorn River alone has a long-term industrial allocation capacity of
697,000 acre-feet. The Fontennele, Navajo, and Powell Reservoirs on the Upper Colorado River
have a long-term industrial capacity of 485,250 acre-feet. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at
33. Millions of acre-feet may also be available on the main-stem of the Missouri River. A Popelne
That Is Inciting a Water War, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1981, at 59.
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-94 (1924),
the Supreme Court defined commerce to include navigation.
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Under this clause, and the necessary and proper clause, ld.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18, Congress may appropriate water for federal lands. The supremacy clause, id. art.
VI, cl. 2, ensures that state law cannot intervene.
25. For example, Montana law permits its Board of Natural Resources to reserve waters
within the state for beneficial uses, including instream flows. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316
(1979). Instream flow maintenance for purposes of ecological and environmental preservation is
increasingly recognized as a valid beneficial use under state water law. Tarlock, Appropriationfor
Instream Flow Maintenance." A ProgressReport on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 211, 213.
26. E.g., Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 1982)
(tribes have authority to regulate riparian rights of non-Indian lakeshore owners on the
reservation).
27. Eg, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1981)
(concurrent authority in tribes and states to regulate non-Indians hunting on tribal lands),
28. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557-67 (1981) (tribe has no regulatory
authority over hunting and fishing on lands owned in fee by non-Indians on the reservation).
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The federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes advance
conflicting claims to control western waters on the basis of differing
legal theories and look to different judicial forums to adjudicate their

claims. Citizens holding water rights pursuant to state laws adjudicate
their claims in state courts under state law. The federal government

may claim water for federal lands under either federal or state law.
The federal government represents not only itself, but is also responsi-

ble under the trust doctrine for representing the claims of Indian tribes,
which generally derive from federal law.29 Although the federal government and the Indian tribes prefer to have their claims adjudicated in

federal courts, the Supreme Court has ruled that the McCarran
Amendment3" waived their sovereign immunity to a limited extent.

They may be joined in state water adjudications, even3 when the claims

involve federal and Indian rights under federal law. '
Despite the Supreme Court's assertion in Colorado River Water
ConservationDistrictv. United States that state adjudications of Indian

claims would merely apply federal substantive rights subject to
Supreme Court review and would not prejudice Indian rights, 32 it is
possible that in such cases the choice of forum may determine substantive rights. This is especially true in view of the still undecided extent
of these rights. Further, while the federal government's regulatory authority over resources on federal reserved lands is clear,33 the nature of
29. The Indian tribes are considered to be in a trust relationship with the United States,
which must represent Indian interests. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97
(1942). The Indian tribes are often perturbed by the conflicting roles of the federal government as
financier of western reclamation development, which implicitly involves encouraging non-Indian
settlement, and as protector of Indian water rights, which may involve implicitly discouraging
non-Indian settlement. See NCAIto GAO: Legislative Quantflcationof Indian Water Rights is not
the Answer, AM. INDIAN J., Jan. 1979, at 33, 35.
30. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
31. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805-12 (1976);
United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1971); United States v.
District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 522-26 (1971). Until 1971, it was by no means clear
that the federal government's water rights, arising out of federal law, could be adjudicated in state
court without the federal government's consent. Likewise, until 1976, Indian rights arising out of
federal law were often assumed to be the province of federal courts. Federal and Indian rights
arising from federal law prior to these years were generally adjudicated in federal courts.
32. 424 U.S. 800, 812-13 (1976).
33. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). In Kleppe, the Court held that Congress could, pursuant to the property clause, protect wildlife roaming on federal lands, state law notwithstanding. 426 U.S. at 54546. The Court allowed the federal government to regulate federal land despite recognizing that
such regulation impacted on private lands not otherwise under federal control. Id. at 546.
In Utah Power, the defendants had occupied federal lands without first procuring a federal
license. They maintained that since the federal government did not need or use the land, the land
was subject to state jurisdiction. 243 U.S. at 403-04. The Court rejected this position, stating that
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Indian tribal sovereignty is still being defined. This adds another complicating factor to the disputes over tribal regulation of non-Indian

water rights.
From the time FPCv. Oregon3 4 was decided in 1955 until 1978, it

appeared that the jurisdictional confusion impeding western energy development would be resolved by the increasing federalization of water

law in the West and the imposition of federal priorities. In 1978, however, two Supreme Court cases, UnitedStates v. New Mexico 35 and Cal[fornia v. United States,3 6 considerably restored the balance between

state and federal authority over water. The decline of an arbitrary and
preeminent federalism may give rise to a beneficial framework of nego-

tiation between the states, the federal government, and the Indian
tribes.37 Such an improvement requires, however, that Indian rights
not be governed by the restrictive views of federal non-Indian rights.
This Article will argue that extending the restrictive views of federal
38
non-Indian rights to Indian rights is inappropriate.

Although state water rights are being clarified, the extent of Indian
water rights and Indian sovereignty over reservation water resources

used by non-Indians remains uncertain. Clarification of Indian reserved water rights and of Indian regulatory authority over reservation

waters would not only benefit the Indian peoples, it would also remove
impediments, resulting from confusion over jurisdictional authority, to
good faith negotiations between the governmental entities and private

industry aimed at devising rational approaches to energy development.
Congress had authority under the property clause and the history of decisions of the Court to
control use of federal lands. Id. at 404-05.
34. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). For an account of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 10615.
35. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
36. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
37. See Wilkinson, Perspectives on Water and Energy in the American West and in Indian
Country, 26 S.D.L. REv. 393 (1981). Wilkinson makes the following statement regarding the
claims of Indians and non-Indians in the West:
[T]he parties are not going to disappear and neither are their common problems. We
need to move away from the violence, anarchy, and racism that have attended resource
issues in the American West for too long. What we need to do now is to proceed with a
sense of cooperation, good faith, and optimism-not toward the courtroom but toward
the bargaining table.
Id. at 404.
38. Although federal and Indian claims to proprietary rights in water may appear at first to
be related and to rest on the same rationales, it may be argued that not only is the Indian position
often stronger than the federal position, but that the very weakness of the federal position threatens to discredit the Indian position if they are too closely associated. Moreover, federal claims to
water for federal reservations may directly conflict with Indian claims to water for their
reservations.
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This Article will review the legal doctrines underlying the jurisdictional claims to water of the federal government, the Indian tribes, and
the states, and will attempt to formulate what appears to be the emerg-

ing balance among the jurisdictions. It will focus on the Upper Colorado River Basin and the Upper Missouri River Basin states of

Colorado, Utah, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota,
New Mexico, and Arizona, highlighting the implications of the juris-

dictional disputes for energy development.
II.

NON-INDIAN FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS

The reserved rights doctrine as developed since the 1908 decision
of UnitedStates v. Winters3 9 states that whenever the United States cre-

ated an Indian reservation by treaty, act of Congress, or executive order, appurtenant water was implicitly reserved to fulfill the purposes

for which the reservation was created. Federal reserved water rights
were established by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Caifornia.4 0 The
Court in that case applied the doctrine of reserved water rights, hitherto
confined to Indian reservations, to federal non-Indian reservations in
the Lower Colorado River Basin.41
Arizona v. California involved the apportionment of the Lower
Colorado River Basin waters by the Boulder Canyon Project Act.4 2

The United States claimed water for five Indian reservations4 3 pursuant
to the reserved rights doctrine and added several claims for non-Indian
The Supreme Court, without any analysis,
federal reservations.'
agreed to extend the doctrine to non-Indian reservations.4 5
Initially it was thought that federal reserved rights would enable
39. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
40. 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963).
41. Id. at 601.
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976). The Colorado River Basin was divided into Upper and
Lower Basins by the Colorado River Compact, which was negotiated in 1922. The Compact may
be found at 70 CONG. REc. 324 (1928) and 1 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL RECLAMATION AND RELATED LAWS ANNOTATED 441-45 (1972). The Compact went into effect in 1929,
although Arizona did not ratify it until 1944. Meyers, The ColoradoRiver, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 12
(1966). The Compact apportioned the water of the Colorado Basin between the Upper Basin
states of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico, and the Lower Basin states of Arizona,
California, and Nevada. The Lower Basin begins officially at Lee Ferry, Arizona. 373 U.S. at
557.
43. These reservations were the Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River, and the Fort
Mohave. 373 U.S. at 595 & n.97.
44. The federal reservations involved were the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the
Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge, and the Gila.
National Forest. See id. at 601.
45. Id.
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the federal government to increase its control of western waters for con47
servation purposes. 46 However, continuing criticism of these rights,

which culminated in their limitation by the Supreme Court in United
States v. New Mexico ,48 has decreased their efficacy for conservation
purposes.
Nevertheless, following the New Mexico opinion, the Solicitor of
the Department bf the Interior in 1979 claimed non-reserved waters
appurtenant to federal lands, which were unappropriated under state
laws, for the accomplishment of land use purposes mentioned in congressional enactments.49 This newly devised doctrine differed from the
reserved rights doctrine in several ways. Reserved rights arise by implication from the reservation of federal land for specific purposes, and
are designed to provide water for such reservations. Not all federal
land is reserved. "Reservation" of land implies dedication to a certain
use, such as national parks, national forests, and wildlife refuges.
Other federal land is merely considered "withdrawn" from settlement
and is managed by the federal government.5 0 Reserved water rights
have priority as of the date of the reservation. The reserved land has
water rights in the quantity reserved, superior to those claims based on
state rights with later priority dates. In times of shortage, the federal
government may use its rights to appropriate water to the detriment of
junior state appropriators. The quantity of water reserved is determined by the purposes of the reservation, and these water rights are not
46. See Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F.Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980). See also Trelease, Federal
Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Water Rights
Since PLLRC]. Regarding his contribution to the National Water Commission's efforts in the
early 1970's, Trelease wrote, "The most that can be said for my efforts is that they dispelled the
myth that reserved rights were a source of federal power and a valuable conservation tool that
gave freedom from state control." Id. at 481.
47. See F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW, LEGAL STUDY No. 5
(1971) (prepared for the National Water Commission) [hereinafter cited as WATER STUDY No. 5];
C. WHEATLEY, C. CORKER, T. STETSON & D. REED, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBLIC LANDS (1969) (prepared for the Public
Land Law Review Commission) [hereinafter cited as C. WHEATLEY].
48. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). For an account of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
159-68.
49. Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of
Reclamation & the Bureau of Land Management, 86 I.D. 553, 612-17 (1979) (Solicitor Opinion)
[hereinafter cited as Sol. Op. 1979], modoledby Supplement to Solicitor Opinion No. M-36914, on
Federal Water Rights of the National Park Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation & the Bureau of Land Management, 88 I.D. 253 (1981) (Solicitor Opinion) [hereinafter cited
as Sol. Op. Jan. 1981] and by Nonreserved Water Rights-United States Compliance with State
Law, 88 I.D. 1055 (1981) (Solicitor Opinion) [hereinafter cited as Sol. Op. Sept. 1981].
50. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL AND PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW

197

(1981). Much of the present non-reserved land under federal management was withdrawn pursuant to Executive Orders of Nov. 26, 1934 and Feb. 5, 1935.
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lost by non-use." Moreover, the federal government need not comply
with either the substantive or procedural provisions of state law when it
claims reserved water rights.
In contrast, the alleged rights of the federal government in nonreserved water are more closely akin to water rights as defined by state
prior appropriation law. 2 Their contours, however, are somewhat uncertain. 3 The priority dates of federal non-reserved water rights arise
either from "actual use" or from "action taken leading to an actual
use." The quantity is limited either by the "purpose" of the use or the
"quantity" used. Their purpose is determined by either "management
objectives specified in congressional directives," by "congressionally
authorized uses," or by "congressionally authorized management programs."54 As with reserved rights, state law need not be complied with
in claiming these rights, although such compliance is thought
advisable. 5
The Solicitor claimed these non-reserved federal water rights for
both federal reserved lands, such as national parks, and for the withdrawn lands. The agencies would use the water for consumptive uses,
such as grazing, timber production, and recreational campgrounds, or
for non-consumptive
uses, such as instream uses for fish and wildlife
56
conservation.

Although this attempt by the federal government to circumvent
state law in appropriating water through the theory of non-reserved
federal rights was removed when the part of the Solicitor's opinion advancing these rights was rescinded,57 the rationale of the opinion is still
very much alive, and a change of administration may resuscitate these
claims. Similar doctrines periodically appear within the federal government as a means of appropriating large quantities of water for conservation purposes.58
51. Sol. Op. 1979, supra note 49, at 573.
52. The non-reserved federal water rights, like state prior appropriation rights, would arise
from actual use, would have priority dates relating to actual use, and would not adversely affect
prior state water rights. Sol. Op. 1979, supra note 49, at 574.
53. Comment, FederalNon-Reserved Water Rights, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 67, 73 (1980).
54. Sol. Op. 1979, supra note 49, at 574-75, 613.
55. Id. at 577-78; Sol. Op. Jan. 1981, supra note 49, modified Sol. Op. 1979 to require compliance with state law in managing certain federal land.
56. Sol. Op. 1979, supra note 49, at 615-17.
57. Sol. Op. Sept. 1981, supra note 49, at 1064. "I must conclude therefore that there is no
federal 'non-reserved' water right." Id. A similar result was reached by the Justice Department.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, FEDERAL "NON-RESERVED"

WATER

RIGHTS (June 16, 1982).
58. One commentator has noted that in the late 1960's and in 1974, various officials of the
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The federal claims to reserved water and the short-lived claims to
non-reserved waters have two rationales. One is that the federal government has proprietary rights in the water.5 9 The other is that the
federal government reserves or appropriates water pursuant to the sovereign authority of Congress to take all actions "necessary and proper"
to fulfill the congressional power to regulate the property of the United
States.60
A.

ProprietaryRationaleforFederal Water Rights
1. Description

The argument for federal ownership of water has been set forth as
follows:
It has been argued that the United States owns all unappropriated, nonnavigable waters found or originating on public lands in the western states, or at least in those states which
have adopted prior-appropriation doctrine. The basis for the
argument may be summarized as follows: Except for Texas,
the United States at one time owned almost all of the land,
and all of the water appurtenant to the land it owned, in the
seventeen western states. With admission to statehood, the
states acquired those interests in navigable streams which are
an incident of sovereignty. But the states by the mere act of
admission did not acquire title to nonnavigable waters any
more than they acquired title to the public lands on which
those waters were found. It follows, therefore, that unless the
United States has disposed of such land or such waters, it is
still the owner. 61
However, the argument would proceed to point out that the Acts of
1866,62 1870,63 and 18771 separated the federal land from the common
law riparian rights which would otherwise attach to the land when it is
conveyed to private owners.6"
Interior Department devised policies to condition the use of water by those receiving permits or
licenses. This, in effect, would have conferred federal water rights to unappropriated water on the
public domain, state law notwithstanding. Muys, Legal Problems Involved in Developing Water
Suppliesfor Energy Development, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 335, 340-341 (1975).
59. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
60. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
61. Morreale, Federal-StateRights andRelations,in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 102.1,
at 51-52, (R. Clark ed. 1967) (citations omitted).
62. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)).
63. Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)).
64. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976)).
65. The riparian rights doctrine is derived from the English common law and is the prevalent
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Each of these Acts was a land act. The Act of 1866 was passed to
confirm the rights of the miners trespassing on the public domain.66
Section nine protected the rights of the miners and others who had previously used water on the public domain. 67 This section was amended

by the Act of 1870 to protect those appropriating water pursuant to the
1866 Act from having their rights obstructed by subsequent federal
land patentees.6 8 Commentators differ as to whether these two Acts
together validated appropriation rights after 1866.69
The Desert Land Act of 187770 provided for the sale of 640 acre
doctrine in the eastern United States. Under this doctrine, the owner of land appurtenant to water
receives rights to the "natural flow" of the water. He cannot take so much as to deplete the
natural flow of the water body, as other riparian owners have equal rights to such flow. The
doctrine has been modified to allow for the "reasonable use" of appurtenant water. Riparian
rights are not lost by non-use.
By contrast, the prior appropriation doctrine, which grew up in the more arid western regions
of the country, permitted the transportation of water to non-appurtenant lands. Water rights are
based upon the quantity actually used, and the priority date is either the date of actual use or of
application for such use. In times of shortage, those with earlier priority dates receive preference
in the allocation of water. In this system, water rights are lost by non-use. Western states are
divided between those adhering to the prior appropriation doctrine and those adhering to both
that doctrine and the riparian rights doctrine.
For a more detailed description of these water doctrines, see F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW (3d
ed. 1979).
66. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 153.
67. Section 9 of the 1866 Act provided in part:
And be itfurther enacted, That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of
water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and
the decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and protected in the same; and the right of way for the construction of ditches and
canals for the purposes aforesaid is hereby acknowledged and confirmed ....
Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)).
68. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 161; WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147c. Section 17 of the 1870 Act provided in part:
[A]I patents granted, or pre-emption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any
vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connection
with such water rights, as may have been acquired under or recognized by the ninth
section of the act of which this act is amendatory.
Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1976)).
69. Compare C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 161 (acts validated state law prior to 1866 and
sanctioned acquisition pursuant to state law after 1866) with Note, Federal-StateConflicts Over the
Control of Western Waters, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 971 (1960) (acts settled question of state rights
prior to 1866 but were not clear about subsequent rights).
70. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976)). The
Act of 1877 provided in part:
Providedhowever that the right to the use of water by the person so conducting the same,
on or to any tract of desert land of six hundred and forty acres shall depend upon bona
fide prior appropriation. . . and all surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply
upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to
existing rights.
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tracts of desert lands in most western states, and the rights to appropriate water for them. The Act applied to the states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. In 1891, an amendment added Colorado. 7 '
These Acts recognized local law and custom as governing water
rights for purposes of private acquisition. Therefore, private parties acquiring federal land had to look to the territories, and afterwards the
states, for their water rights. However, for many years the courts differed in their interpretations of the Acts.
The varying court analyses were based upon the clause in the Desert Land Act of 1877 which stipulated that all "surplus" water not
taken for irrigating the 640 acre tracts, together with all non-navigable
waters, "shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of
the public."7 2 The Oregon Supreme Court thought this clause mandated the adoption of prior appropriation doctrine in all Desert Land
Act states.73 This became known as the Oregon Doctrine. In contrast,
the California Doctrine held that the Desert Land Act specifically applied the prior appropriation doctrine only to the 640 acre tracts of desert land which were the subject of the 1877 Act. The California courts
reasoned that this surplus water clause merely confirmed that other
lands on the public domain were to be governed by both the riparian
rights doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine, depending upon
the priority of the rights.74
In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement Co. ,7the Ninth Circuit agreed with the California courts and stated that the
Desert Land Act did not mandate the prior appropriation doctrine.76
The court went on, however, to hold that Oregon's adoption of the doctrine was still valid as an exercise of its police powers.7 7 The Supreme
71. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 8, 26 Stat. 1095, 1097 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 323 (1976)).
See 1 W. HuTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 173 (1971); Ran-

quist, The Winters Doctrine andHow It Grew. FederalReservation ofRights to the Use of Water,
1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 639, 644.
72. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1976)). See
supra note 70 for the text of this portion of the Act of 1877.
73. Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 399, 98 P. 1083, 1095 (1909).
74. San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Worswick, 187 Cal. 674, 689-91,
203 P. 999, 1006 (1922).
75. 73 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1934), aj'd, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
76. Id. at 560-62.
77. Id. at 568-69.
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Court finally resolved the issue by affirming the Ninth Circuit, but on
different grounds. 78 The Court rejected the California Doctrine, 79 deriving from the "surplus water" clause of the Desert Land Act an intent
on the part of Congress to validate state law. The Court differed from
the Oregon court, however, in that it determined that Congress did not
intend to require adoption of prior appropriation law, but meant to
leave to the states the type of water law they might wish to adopt.80
One approach taken by those advocating the proprietary rationale
for federal reserved rights is that but for the Acts of 1866, 1870, and
1877, common law riparian rights rather than state law would apply to
the settled portions of what was formerly the federal domain. Therefore, the applicability of state water law derives from congressional action which opened the land to settlement and recognized state water
law as governing with relation to such settlement. It then follows that
unsettled federal lands retain riparian rights to the extent the water is
not appropriated pursuant to these Acts. Reservation of such land, by
removing the right to settle the land, counteracts the effects of these
Acts and confirms federal common law riparian rights to water not
hitherto appropriated. Accordingly, the reserved water rights doctrine
would merely be something of an extension of federal riparian rights."'
The problem with this approach, however, is that federal claims to
reserved rights go far beyond traditional riparian rights. Pursuant to
federal reserved rights, the United States claims water necessary for the
purposes of the reservation, without any restrictions as to the effect on
upstream or downstream riparian owners. Under the riparian rights
doctrine, the landowner is entitled to use appurtenant water only insofar as the use does not disrupt the "natural flow" of the water body, to
which other riparian owners are also entitled. A variation of the doctrine would allow a landowner to make "reasonable use" of the water,
but not to disrupt the equivalent reasonable use rights of other landowners.8 2 Neither version would allow the landowner to take water
without regard to other landowners, as would be the case with the reserved rights doctrine.
Therefore, a second and better argument derives reserved water
78. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 165 (1935).
79. Id. at 161-62.
80. Id. at 163-64.
81. See Morreale, supra note 61, § 102.4, at 58-61.
82. For a comparison of the riparian rights doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine, see
supra note 65.
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rights from the fact that all water on the public domain was once under
federal ownership. Water which was unappropriated pursuant to state
law under the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 remained under federal
ownership and was reserved along with reserved land to the extent necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.8 3
However, much of the federal land withdrawn from settlement
was not reserved for a particular purpose.84 Following either analysis,
reserved rights should apply to these lands, since the Acts of 1866,
1870, and 1877 would cease to apply at the time the lands were withdrawn and placed under the management of the federal government.
Under the first approach, which maintains that reserved rights are derived from the common law riparian rights of federal lands, there is no
reason why withdrawn lands should not also have these riparian rights.
Under the second approach, if reserved rights represent the residue of
federal ownership of unappropriated public domain water, then they
should be utilized on behalf of lands "withdrawn" to be managed for a
variety of purposes as well as land "reserved" for specific purposes.
Yet, the reserved rights doctrine has been litigated only with respect to
reserved lands. Hence, the non-reserved rights doctrine was devised to
allow the federal government to disregard state laws to the extent that
water was actually used on federal lands, including withdrawn lands.
Rights to water which would have been taken pursuant to this doctrine,
however, unlike rights to water taken pursuant to the reserved rights
doctrine, would have had a priority date of actual use and therefore
would have been inferior to state rights arising before the federal use
but subsequent to the federal withdrawal of the land. 85 The doctrine of
non-reserved rights was shortlived. In view of the extensiveness of
withdrawn lands,86 adoption of this doctrine would have resulted in
substantially greater federal control over western waters.
2.

Analysis

Although the proprietorship rationale for federal reserved water
rights has enjoyed a certain popularity in Washington, D.C.,8 7 it can
only be supported by a mosaic of dicta and holdings taken out of con83. See WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 111-16, 138-43 for an elaboration and rebuttal of the argument.
84. See supra text accompanying note 50.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
86. The Bureau of Land Management had jurisdiction over 450 million acres as of 1977. G.
COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 50, at 824.
87. Water Rights Since PLLRC, supra note 46, at 475-76.
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text and artificially linked by a confusing array of implications and
counter-implications.
In CaliforniaOregon Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement Co.,88
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Supreme Court, upheld Oregon
prior appropriation law in derogation of common law riparian rights,
on the basis of the Desert Land Act:
As the owner of the public domain, the government possessed the power to dispose of land and water thereon together, or to dispose of them separately. The fair construction
of the provision now under review is that Congress intended
to establish the rule that for the future the land should be patented separately; and that all non-navigable waters thereon
should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of
the states and territories named. . . . The terms of the statute, thus construed, must be read into every patent thereafter
issued, with the same force as though expressly incorporated
therein, with the result that the grantee will take the legal title
to land conveyed, and such title, and only such title, to the
flowing waters thereon as shall be fixed or acknowledged by
the customs, laws, and judicial decisions of the state of their
location. If it be conceded that in the absence of federal legislation the state would be powerless to affect the riparian rights
of the United States or its grantees, still, the authority of Congress to vest such power in the state, and that it has done so by
the legislation to which we have referred, cannot be
doubted.8 9
Justice Sutherland implied a congressional intent to recognize state
water law in western states and territories from a land statute which
merely provided for the reclamation of desert land in those states and
territories. Those advocating the proprietorship rationale rely upon
Justice Sutherland's implication for the further implication that Congress recognized its continued ownership of water not so granted to the
states. 90 It appears, however, that the Court's reading of the Desert
88. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
89. Id. at 162 (citations omitted).
90. See Trelease, Uneasy Federalism-StateWater Laws andNationalWater Uses, 55 WASH.
L. REv. 751, 764 n.66 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Uneasy Federalism]. Trelease criticizes Sol. Op.
1979, supra note 49, for following similar assumptions in making the case for federal non-reserved

rights:
If Congress had clearly and unequivocally granted to the states the power to dispose of
some of the waters, or granted to members of the public water rights obtained by complying with state law, then it would have impliedly acted on the theory that it owned all
the water, and therefore retained an interest in what was left. But since there was no real
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Land Act as a water act delegating authority to the states was wrong. 9t
It seems ironic that a case recognizing state jurisdiction over water
should be used to support federal proprietary claims, especially since
Justice Sutherland, a spokesman for western states' rights, may have
meant to justify the separation of water both on reserved and non-reserved federal land from federal jurisdiction.92 Significantly, the opinion speaks of recognizing state law on the "public domain," a term
which refers to both reserved and non-reserved federal lands. Nonreserved lands are correctly denoted as "public lands."93 If the opinion
is interpreted as it was probably intended to be, it creates other
problems with the reserved rights doctrine. The doctrine itself involves
the implication of a reservation of appurtenant water from the reservation of federal land. If this doctrine is held to counteract state authority
over water conferred by the Desert Land Act, then it would constitute
94
repeal by implication, a proposition not favored by the law.
In defending the proprietary rationale, one commentator has
noted that the facts of California Oregon Power Co. dealt with private
patentees of federal lands. The case recognized the severance of federal riparian common law from federal land, so that the conveyance of
federal land to a private party would not also convey common law riparian rights, but rather whatever rights were recognized under state
law. However, the facts did not involve the remaining proprietary
grant,... to imply a grant and from the implied grant imply a claim to what was not
granted seems one bridge too far.
Uneasy Federalism,supra, at 764 n.66.
91. See Corker, A RealLive Problem or Twofor the Waning Energies a/FrankJ Trelease, 54
DEN. L.J. 499, 500 (1977); Water Rights Since PLLRC, supra note 46, at 476. Corker voices his

criticism of Justice Sutherland's interpretation of the Desert Land Act:
For his first offense, I would not seek to disbar the federal lawyer who invokes the reservation doctrine .... As punishment such a lawyer should do what Trelease and I have
both done-he should read the full legislative history of the Desert Land Act of 1877,
and other statutes which Justice Sutherland misread and distorted in California Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver PortlandCement Co. in 1935. You have to read it all before you can

say that nothing is there, but I can say it.
Corker, supra, at 500 (citations omitted); Grow & Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as FederalCon.
mon Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 457, 468-69 (1977).

The Act of 1866 appears to have been intended merely to protect water claims from future
patentees of federal lands rather than to delegate water law to the states. WATER STUDY No. 5,
supra note 47, at 147c. But see C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 157, stating, "[s]ection 9 [of the

1866 Act] survives and is the foundation in a real way of the present law of water rights on
reserved as well as unreserved portions of the federal public domain."
92. For a description of Justice Sutherland's anti-federalist bias, see Fairfax & Tarlock, No
Waterfor the Woods A CriticalAnalysisof United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHo L. REV. 509,

516 n.29 (1979).
93. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 187.

94. See Grow & Stewart, supra note 91, at 466-67.
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rights of the federal government, and the case should not be construed
as severing all waters from federal jurisdiction. 5 This line of reasoning
would seem to be supported by the language in the "surplus water"
clause of the Desert Land Act itself, which refers to "public lands"
rather than the "public domain." 96 Therefore, it is arguable that the
Court should have been more exact in its use of language and should
have confined its severance doctrine only to non-reserved "public
lands."
The advocates of the proprietary rationale must therefore assume
an inconsistent position. They must accept enough of Justice Sutherland's reasoning to establish the alleged congressional cognizance of its
ownership of water, but not so much as to establish total congressional
delegation to the states of control of waters within their boundaries.
There are practical as well as theoretical difficulties with accepting
the analysis of CaiforniaOregon Power Co. The Desert Land Act does
not apply to the public domain states of Kansas, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma. If the California Oregon Power Co. rationale is adopted,
land conveyances in these states, even after 1877, would convey
riparian rights, regardless of the water law system adopted by the
state.9 7 For example, under this reasoning Nebraska should have been
precluded from adopting a prior appropriation system as it did in
1889.11 Moreover, even in Desert Land Act states, federal conveyances
prior to 187799 would carry riparian rights regardless of state law. According to one commentator, such a ruling "would raise havoc" in certain western states.' 0 0
Another problem arises from the fact that the Desert Land Act
refers only to non-navigable water. The logic of Calfornia Oregon
Power Co. would, therefore, dictate that land which was formerly federal land appurtenant to navigable water carries riparian rights despite
state law, a result which would create "inconceivable chaos" in certain
places. 01' However, there is precedent to support the argument that
states receive sovereignty over navigable waters upon entering the
95. Morreale, supra note 61, § 102.4, at 61-63.
96. See supra note 70 for the text of the relevant portion of the Desert Land Act of 1877.
97. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 168.
98. Note, supra note 69, at 976 n.59.
99. In CaliforniaOregon Power Co., the Court spoke of severing non-navigable waters "following the act of 1877, if not before." 295 U.S. at 163. The phrase "if not before" may refer to the
Act of 1866. See WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147h.
100. WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147h.
101. Id. at 147g.
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Union. 10 2 While this argument would alleviate one of the difficulties in
adhering to the Caifornia Oregon Power Co. rationale, it would do so

at the cost of severely undercutting its value as a support for federal
reserved rights. Arizona v. Caiffornia, the case establishing federal re-

served rights on non-Indian reservations
Colorado

River."°

°3

dealt with the navigable

Moreover, if the rule of Calfornia Oregon Power

Co. is confined to non-navigable waters, there is still the concern of
how to differentiate between navigable and non-navigable waters.105
Another case which has been cause for much concern among op-

ponents of federal reserved rights based on proprietary claims is FPCv.
Oregon.116 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the state of Ore-

gon could not block the FPC's licensing of a private hydro-electric facility on federal reserved lands.' 0 7 The decision, however, did not

involve water rights, federal or otherwise. Although the dam could be
constructed under the sovereign authority of the federal government to
regulate federal lands and reservations, any appropriation of water by
the licensee would be subject to vested state rights.10 8 The appropriation of any water subject to vested state rights could only be obtained
by condemnation under the Federal Power Act. 10 9
The Court noted in dictum that the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877

did not apply to federal reservations.1 0 From this dictum, it has been
deduced that federal jurisdiction over water -attaches to reservations in
102. See supra text accompanying note 61. See also Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 335-36, 10P.
674, 719 (1886) (dictum) (relying on Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)). The
holding ofPollard,however, dealt with the beds of navigable waters rather than navigable waters
as such.
103. See supra text accompanying note 40.
104. 373 U.S. at 597.
105. The problem with creating a dichotomy between navigable and non-navigable waters for
the purpose of determining state sovereignty is the definition of navigable waters. It is continually
being changed in cases where the definition of navigable waterways for purposes of determining
the powers of the United States to regulate interstate commerce is an issue. Compare The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (navigable rivers are those used as "highways for commerce" between states) with Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 115-24
(1921) (river that was once navigable is still navigable even though it has not been used for commerce in 95 years) and United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940)
(river is navigable if reasonable improvements will make it suitable for commerce). Advocates of
federal proprietary theories do not say whether states acquire increments of sovereignty every time
the Supreme Court redefines navigability, or, for that matter, whether navigability for purposes of
the commerce clause is coextensive with navigability for purposes of the property clause.
106. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
107. Id. at 437, 444.
108. Id. at 445 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 821).
109. 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
110. 349 U.S. at 447-48.
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derogation of state law."' Immediately following this decision, states'
rights advocates introduced a series of bills to reinstate state jurisdiction over water." 2 Yet it is arguable whether state jurisdiction over
waters appurtenant to reservations was threatened in the first place.
One study has noted that the dictum was only a threat to the states'
jurisdiction over water if one believes that such jurisdiction derived
from the 1866, 1870, and 1877 legislation." 3 However, on their faces,
these Acts were land laws designed to recognize or authorize land
claims on the public domain, not water laws delegating power to the
states."14
Viewed in this context, the dictum in FPC v. Oregon is unexceptional. The Acts could not apply to federal reservations simply because
these areas are not open to public appropriation." t5 The Supreme
Court, in raising the assertion of the inapplicability of these Acts, was
rebutting Oregon's argument that it could use the authority over water
derived from these Acts to preclude the exercise of congressional authority over hydro-electric facilities licensing. No mention of federal
reserved rights was made. It would seem anomalous to infer that the
federal government has the right to appropriate water in preference to
off-reservation state appropriators with later priority dates from a case
explicitly recognizing the Federal Power Act provision respecting the
vested water rights of off-reservation users.
The proprietary rationale fares no better if it is viewed as an extension of federal common law riparian rights which are protected, by the
act of reservation, from appropriation by settlers. Lux v. Haggin" 6 was
the leading nineteenth century case assuming that a conveyance of federal land which was a part of the public domain carried with it common law riparian rights. This assumption has been described as a
"mistake.""' 7 In addition, this case is of limited utility to advocates of
federal proprietorship of water, since the case is ambiguous on the
11. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1981) where the
court concluded that state water law was preempted by the creation of Indian reservations. Note
that in this case the court precluded state jurisdiction even over water which was not technically
reserved (as it was beyond the needs of the reservation) because the water was situated completely
on the reservation. Id.
112. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 88; see Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western
Waters-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423 (1966).
113. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 89.
114. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
115. 349 U.S. at 444.
116. 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
117. WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 46, at 147a.
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source of the riparian rights of federal lands. One option the court entertained was that non-navigable as well as navigable waters were
vested in California when it became a state. Sovereignty over navigable waters would have passed to California as a result of its admission
to the Union." 8 Non-navigable waters would have become the property of California, as the successor to Mexico. Under this reasoning,
federal riparian rights to non-navigable waters were derived from California's adoption of the English common law as the rule of decision.' 1 9
One commentator suggests that had the case come to the conclusion
that California had adopted the prior appropriation doctrine, the
United States would have had no property interest in the water.' 20
This analysis concludes with United States v. Rio GrandeDam &
IrrigationCo. 121 In Rio Grande, the Supreme Court upheld the right of
the United States to enjoin a state licensed dam on a non-navigable
tributary of the navigable Rio Grande River because the dam would
have interfered with the navigable capacity of that river. 22 The Court
based its decision on section ten of the Act of September 19, 1890,123
authorizing the federal government to regulate obstructions affecting
navigable waters. The Court noted that the Acts of 1866 and 1877 recognized state law with regard to prior appropriation of water, 24 but the
Court held that those Acts could not be construed to limit federal authority over navigable waters, or, if they could be so interpreted, Congress would be deemed to have modified them by the Act of 1890. In
describing the water law situation before Congress became involved,
the Court reviewed the English common law riparian rights doctrine as
defined by Chancellor Kent.' 2- The Court then propounded this oftquoted passage of dicta:
Although this power of changing the common law rule as
118. See supra text accompanying note 90.
119. 69 Cal. at 337-39, 10 P. at 720-21. Other rationales cited by the court for federal property
rights in non-navigable waters were that the United States had acquired such rights as the sovereign successor to Mexico or that the United States acquired the rights as a result of California's
entry into the Union on an "equal footing" basis. Just as the non-navigable waters were the
property of adjacent landowners in the original states, the court reasoned, so property owners,
including the United States, could be held to have acquired similar rights upon the admission of
subsequent states. Id. at 335-36, 10 P. at 719-20.
120. Note, supra note 69, at 973 n.38.
121. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
122. Id. at 709-10.
123. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, § 10, 26 Stat. 426, 454, superseded by Act of Mar. 3,
1899, § 9, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976)).
124. 174 U.S. at 704-05.
125. Id. at 702.
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to streams within its dominion undoubtedly belongs to each
State, yet two limitations must be recognized: First, that in

the absence of specific authority from Congress a State cannot
by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the

owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow
of its waters ... 126

This dicta appears in many analyses of federal water law. Yet, as
one commentator has noted, Chancellor Kent's definition of riparian

rights "has never been the law in any jurisdiction where water is
scarce."' 27 This must be true, as traditional riparianism did not allow
the "diminution or alteration" of the water flow, or any use of the water

to the prejudice of other riparian owners.

28

In water scarce regions,

impractical. 12 9

such restrictions are simply
When used as a support for the reserved rights doctrine, the Rio
Grande case is at once too broad and too narrow. It is too narrow

because, as noted above, common law riparian rights are far more limited than federal reserved rights. 3 ' Even were federal riparian rights
to be recognized, they could not serve to support the reserved rights

doctrine. It is too broad, however, in that it makes no distinction between federal reserved and federal withdrawn lands. As noted above,
126. Id. at 703.
127. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 92.
128. 174 U.S. at 702 (quoting Chancellor Kent).
129. The contention that common law riparian rights originally attached to federal lands has
been called a "myth." Uneasy Federalism,supra note 90, at 764. In Sturr v. Beck, 133 U.S. 541,
551-52 (1890), the Court used language which may have indicated that a federal land patent could
convey riparian rights, although the opinion was based on South Dakota law. The early Supreme
Court cases of Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 275-76 (1879), and Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 670, 682-84 (1874), both mention the 1866 Act as confirming prior appropriation rights
under local territorial or state law. The implication has been drawn that but for such federal
statutory recognition of local law, federally derived riparian rights would apply. See Note, supra
note 69, at 974 n.51. But cf Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 347 (1909), in
which Arizona prior appropriation law was recognized as controlling, without reference to federal
statutes, as the prior appropriation rule is "based upon economic considerations, and an effort,
adequate or not, to get the greatest use from all available land." Id. at 347.
These cases were decided at a time when the common law tradition was thought to be a
coherent body of doctrine which applied in the absence of any other law. See generally Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166, 169-71 (1842) (discussing the application of general commercial law
in the absence of a local statute). When beginning an analysis of property law in newly settled
territories of the United States, the Court naturally turned first to common law doctrines of riparian ownership of water rights. There is no indication in any of these cases, however, that the
territories or states derived their prerogative to contravene the common law from the federal government, or that territorial or state water law would have been invalid in the absence of federal
enactments. The Rio Grande dictum, viewed in this context, is better interpreted as an assertion of
federal sovereign power to the water needed for federal lands, rather than any indication of federal proprietary rights. See WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147k.
130. See supra text accompanying note 82.
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even the most ardent federalist would not claim that federal withdrawn
land is inparimateria with federal reserved land with regard to water
3
rights.' '
In conclusion, it appears that the federal reserved rights are not
mere ratifications of federal proprietary rights. If the proprietary rationale does not explain them, then they must be appropriations of
water taken pursuant to federal sovereign authority to regulate the public domain.
B.

Sovereignty Rationalefor FederalReserved Rights
The argument for federal reserved rights, based upon the sover-

eignty rationale, proceeds as follows: Congress may authorize the appropriation of water, whether from a navigable or non-navigable
stream, pursuant to its constitutional powers to regulate the public domain under the property clause 132 and to take all actions which are
"necessary and proper" to implement other constitutional powers. 33
State laws are precluded from obstructing such appropriations by the
supremacy clause.' 34 No resort to any doctrine of antecedent federal
proprietary rights is required.13 The doctrine of implied federal reserved rights would, therefore, be based on the implied intent of Con-

gress to appropriate the requisite amount of water for the purposes36 of a
reservation when it authorized the creation of such reservation.

If the required water is unappropriated, Congress need not pay
compensation. Even if it is "owned" by a state or by the public under a
state constitution, 37 no compensation need be paid, as a taking of public property for public use does not trigger the fifth amendment compensation provision. 138 Of course, if the water is vested in a person
131. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
132. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
133. Id. art. I, § 8.
134. Id. art. VI, cl. 2: "IT]he Laws of the United States. . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... "
135. WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147m.
136. A more difficult problem arises in implying congressional intent when a reservation is set
aside by executive order rather than an act of Congress. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459, 474, 479-80 (1915), the Supreme Court upheld such reservations based on the concept
that Congress consents to such reservations when it acquiesces to them by doing nothing to nullify
them. This implied authority of the executive branch has been rescinded by § 704(a) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976). However,
this section does not affect past reservations.
137. See, e.g., N.M. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 2; Wyo. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Note, FederalAcquisition of Non-Reserved Water Rights After
New Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REv. 885, 896 (1979).
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under state law, with a priority date superior to that of the federal government, the fifth amendment compensation right applies.

The proponents of the proprietary rationale recognize congressional powers as well as anyone.' 39 They are afraid, however, that

without the supporting assumption of antecedent federal property
rights the reserved rights doctrine, interpreted merely as a description
of federal appropriation powers, would be unable to withstand objec-

tions to its two controversial features.
The first controversy centers on the fact that reserved rights are

inconsistent with state law, regardless of whether the state has adopted
the riparian rights or prior appropriation system,14 0 and would override

state law under the supremacy clause. It was once feared that unless
federal property rights were assumed, state definitions of property
would have to be adopted. The federal government would be confined

to appropriating and condemning state water rights while trying to
come up with the configuration of state water rights best designed to
meet the needs of the reservations. This justification for the federal
proprietary rationale is dubious,' 4 1 although it is still used by some
commentators. 42 In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. 4
139. See Morreale, supra note 61, at § 102.1, 38 (Hanks, Supp. 1978).
140. For a discussion of incompatibility of reserved rights with common law riparian rights,
see supra text accompanying notes 82-83. Reserved rights would be inconsistent with prior appropriation systems because reserved rights are based upon the needs of the reserved land, are not lost
by non-use, and have priority dates based upon the dates the appurtenant land was reserved.
Prior appropriation rights are based on actual use or contemplated actual use, are lost by non-use,
and have priority dates based upon actual use (or dates of filing for actual use). Each state defines
the "beneficial uses" for which the water may be used. In the past, states required that the water
be physically diverted and did not regard "in-stream uses" such as recreation and conservation as
beneficial uses. Such systems would be incompatible with federal reserved rights, which could be
used for conservation purposes, depending upon the original purposes of the reservation. State
law is changing in this regard, however, and recreation and conservation are being recognized as
appropriate uses of water. See infra note 169; F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 39-45 (3d ed. 1979).
141. See WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147m. After arguing against this justification,
Trelease states, "It ought now to be abundantly clear that the reservation doctrine adds nothing to
the power of the United States to take and use the water it needs for any constitutional purpose or
power." Id.
142. See Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 92, at 512. "The Property Clause explains why the
federal government owns rights superior to some state rights, for unless the federal government
owned something, the Supremacy Clause alone only allows the federal government to expropriate
state-created rights after paying just compensation." Id.
143. 412 U.S. 580 (1973). In this case the federal government bought and condemned parcels
of land in Louisiana for a wildlife refuge. The mineral rights were reserved to the former owners
for ten years, subject to extension, upon certain conditions being met. The ten year period expired
and the conditions for extension were not met. The former owners argued that under Louisiana
law, applied retroactively, mineral estates of the type they had retained were imprescriptible and
that therefore they remained the owners. Id. at 582-84. The Court stated that, although property
law was generally a local concern, the application of a state law in this situation was hostile to the
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and United States v. Albrecht,'" the Supreme Court confirmed that

federal definitions of property rights are applicable when the application of state law would frustrate legitimate federal authority. There-

fore, when state law would frustrate a federal purpose, federal law, as
fashioned by the courts, would apply to define property interests when

the federal government appropriates water, even without postulating
antecedent federal rights. Yet it remains true that the Little Lake Misere Land Co. and Albrecht cases contain language favorable to the ap-

plication of state property law where feasible.145 Retention of the

proprietary rationale would decrease the legal necessity of deference to

state law since federal property rights, derived from federal ownership
of the public domain, would constitute a system of property law sui
generis. In contrast, under the federal sovereignty rationale, federal

be an ad hoe legal construction to fill the interreserved rights would
46
stices of state law.'
The second and more important controversy centers on the priority dates of the federal reserved rights which are the dates of reserva-

tion of the appurtenant land. Often, the reservation of federal lands
preceded the settlement of surrounding areas. As these rights are not

lost by non-use, all subsequent settlers attempting to appropriate water
under state law are subject to a cloud on their appropriation to the
extent of the federal government's reserved water rights if the body of

water from which they seek to take water is at some point appurtenant
to federal lands.

This harsh result would be justifiable under the proprietary rationale. Although federal reserved rights are implied from federal reserva-

tion of land under the proprietary rationale, the implication involved is
exercise of federal sovereign authority pursuant to an explicit statutory authorization. In such a
case, a court may apply federal rather than state law. Id. at 594-97. The Court, therefore, upheld
the ownership of the property by the United States. Id. at 604.
144. 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974). This case involved an attempt by the United States to
enforce an easement to prevent drainage of land in order to facilitate waterfowl management.
North Dakota law did not recognize such an easement as a property right. Id. at 909. The court,
relying on Little Lake Misere Land Co., asserted that as this was an issue of national concern, it
could choose federal property law as the rule of decision rather than state law, and under federal
law the conveyance of such an interest in property was valid. Id. at 910-11.
145. Little Lake Misere LandCo., 412 U.S. at 591,594-96; United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d
at 911.
146. See generally NAr'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 459-71 (1973)
(final report). "Federal powers to take water are supreme, but supremacy does not require the
disruption of systems of water rights. . . . Considerations of fairness, accommodation, and comity require that the United States, wherever possible, acquire water rights and not just take water."
Id. at 469 (emphasis in original).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss1/1

28

1982]

Hostyk: Who Controls the Water: The Emerging Balance among Federal, State
WHO CONTROLS THE WATER?

the desire by the federal government to realize its latent property rights
in water. The actual intent of Congress, as construed from legislative
histories, would become less important. Even if the legislative intent
upon which a reserved right was based were considered a legal fiction
invented by the courts, the state would not be unfairly deprived of jurisdiction to which it would otherwise be entitled. Since those espousing this view believe that the federal government has residual property
rights in all unappropriated water appurtenant to federal lands, the reserved rights doctrine would serve to justify broad federal jurisdiction
over water. One study, for example, proposes that water be considered
reserved if such reservation "is reasonably related to enhancement of
the purposes of the withdrawal."14 7
Under the federal sovereignty rationale, however, each appropriation of water by the federal government under the reserved rights doctrine must be judged independently based on the implied intent of
Congress. If no such intent is evident, the reserved right may not be
justified. 148 But even if it is argued that the right is justified without a
finding of congressional intent, it is a legal fiction invented to fulfill a
legitimate purpose and therefore should be strictly limited to the accomplishment of that purpose. As it is the contention of this Article
that the proprietary rationale is unwarranted, actual congressional intent becomes important in determining the breadth of the reserved
rights doctrine.
Is the implication of congressional intent to reserve water for federal non-Indian reservations justified by either congressional enactments concerning the public domain or by their legislative histories?
One study has noted that in regard to the reservation doctrine, "One of
the striking features of this case law is the almost singular absence of
any clear enactment by Congress directly authorizing the reservation of
49
waters for the purpose of the federal withdrawn or reserved lands." 1
Significantly, in view of recent litigation, the study indicates that Congress not only did not intend to reserve adjacent waters when it authorized the reservation of forest lands, it actually appears to have intended
the appropriation of waters on forest lands by nearby settlers pursuant
147. Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 92, at 536.
148. One commentator, referring to non-Indian rights, noted, "The reservation doctrine is a
rhetorical, chimerical, phantasmagoria. It is the product of a fabricated legislative history. It is a

perversion and a prevarication." Corker, supra note 91, at 499-500.
149. C. WHEATLEY, supra note 47, at 150.
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to state law and federal regulations.1 50 Congress had also previously
provided1 for rights of way through reservations for settlers to obtain
water.

15

The reserved rights doctrine, therefore, as based on congressional
intent, may be regarded as a legal fiction created by the courts to meet
certain needs not explicitly provided for by law. 152 Under the federal
sovereignty rationale, these rights should be strictly construed. The two
Supreme Court cases which placed restrictions on federal reserved
rights may best be understood within this framework. In Cappaert v.
UnitedStates,'53 the Court affirmed an injunction preventing the Cappaert ranch from pumping underground water which would have lowered the water table at a national reservation.154 The lowered water
table would have endangered a unique species of fish. The territory
around Devil's Hole in Nevada had been set aside by presidential proclamation in 1952,115 pursuant to the American Antiquities Preservation
150. Id. at 170-71 (citing water provision of the Organic Act relating to the withdrawal of
national forests, Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 482 (1976)).
151. Id. at 158-59 (mentioning the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 43 U.S.C. § 946 (1976) (repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 insofar as it is
applicable to rights of way affecting the National Forest System) which provided for a right of
way across reservation lands). Presumably, the water rights of these companies were acquired by
state law, as the federal government had no prior appropriation system. See California v. United
States, 438 U.S. 645, 659-62 (1978).
152. Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 92, at 520.
If Congress' power to reserve the public domain is discretionary, on what basis can a
court recognize reserved rights by implication? The answer must be that resort to congressional intent is a fiction, for what the Court has been doing is formulating its own
trust standards. The underlying rationale of the non-Indian reserved rights cases seems
to be two unstated assumptions. The first is that when Congress withdraws public land,
it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended to exercise the full extent of its trust
powers.... The second, and equally crucial, assumption is that if the Court has misread Congress' intention, Congress can always abandon the reserved right and reliquish
[sic] the water to the state.
Id. Later in the same article, the authors advance a rationale for the reserved rights doctrine
based on a rebuttable presumption that "Congress has delegated the authority to reserve water
when a federal statute with respect to withdrawn public lands contemplates a water-related use."
Id. at 551.
However, while congressional awareness of its trust responsibility to preserve the nation's
resources has increased during the last two decades, the Congress has often disclaimed any desire
to affect state water law in enactments passed during this period. E.g., Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 94 Stat. 2743, 2786, § 701(g), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 note (1979);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (Supp. IV 1980); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1133(g)(7) (1976); Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b) (1976). Congress has also
provided for the payment ofjust compensation for water rights vested under state law. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1284(b) (1976).
153. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
154. Id. at 147.
155. Proclamation No. 2961, 17 Fed. Reg. 691 (1952), refprintedin 66 Stat. cl8 (1952).
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Act,"'56 for the explicit purpose of preserving the prehistoric cavern and
the fish living in it. While the Court held that the water needed to
preserve the fish had been reserved "explicitly" by the Proclamation,' 57
it still based its analysis on the implied reservation doctrine. The Court
held that only the minimum water necessary to preserve the fish had
water necbeen reserved, as the doctrine "reserves only that amount of
58
essary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more."'1
In United States v. New Mexico, 59 the federal government sought
to reserve water for instream flow for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, fish, and stockwatering purposes"' in the Gila National Forest.
The amount of water in question was small, but the effect of the case as
precedent on those seeking to divert water upstream of national forests
was potentially great. 16 1 The Court held that the Organic Administration Act of 1897162 authorized the reservation of national forests solely
for the purposes of conserving water flows and of ensuring the supply
of timber and not for recreation and wildlife preservation. Therefore
no water could be reserved for the latter purposes based on that Act. 163
The Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 196014 broadened the purposes of National Forests to include, inter alia, outdoor recreation,
wildlife, and fish purposes. The Court considered these latter purposes
to be secondary to the primary purposes of water conservation and timber supply. 165 The Court confined the implication of reserved water 1to
66
primary purposes and denied the claims of the federal government.
156. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976).
157. 426 U.S. at 140.
158. Id. at 141 (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)).
159. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
160. Id. at 704 (citing Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 412-13, 564
P.2d 615, 617-19 (1977)).
161. For example, there are projects transporting thousands of acre-feet of water from the
western slope of the Continental Divide to Denver and other areas on the eastern slope in Colorado. Much of this water is taken from points above national forests and would be affected by
reservations for instream flows below the points of diversion. Boles & Elliott, United States v.
New Mexico and The Course ofFederalReserved Water Rights, 51 U. CoLo. L. REv.209, 221-22

(1980).
162. Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 34 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 473 (1976)).
163. 438 U.S. at 716-18.
164. 438 U.S. at 714-15.
165. The United States did not claim that the 1960 Act reserved water for the additional purposes enumerated with a 1960 priority date. Nevertheless, the Court stated the additional purposes were secondary and administrative and no additional water was reserved for them. Id. at
715.
166. 438 U.S. at 713 n.21, 715. The dissent argued that this assertion is dicta, leaving open the
possibility that additional claims to reserved water can be made under the 1960 Act. 438 U.S. at
718 n.1 (Powell, Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part).
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While the Court's interpretations of the 1897 Act may be open to
question, 67 its endeavor to set limitations on the reserved rights doctrine would seem to be justified. The Court noted, "Where Congress
has expressly addressed the question of whether federal entities must
abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state
law."' 6 8 The Court based its primary/secondary purposes analysis on
this deference, reasoning that as Congress was reluctant to restrict state
jurisdiction, the Court would only do so in the most limited way possible. Therefore it was reasonable to suppose that only water necessary
for the explicitly stated purposes of the reservation was reserved.
At one time it was assumed that without federal proprietorship
concepts the federal government could not obtain water for its lands.
This, however, has been shown not to be the case. The United States
can always obtain as much water as it desires, but it must compensate
those deprived of state water rights which had vested prior to the establishment of the reservation. With the reserved rights doctrine the
United States can avail itself of an earlier priority date and need not
compensate those holding state based rights which vested after the date
of the reservation. Strict construction of federal rights, however, would
limit the ability of federal agencies to use those rights as pretexts for
imposing federal policy priorities, such as conservation of instream
flows, upon western states without congressional authorization. The
federal government would thereby be precluded from preempting the
police powers and jurisdictional authority of the states. In any case, the
assumption that the western states are environmentally backwards,
which was69 an impetus for broadening these rights, may no longer be
1
justified.
C. State Jurisdictionover Water
The states began establishing private property rights in water by
167. A persuasive case may be made that the national forests were set aside for preservation

purposes, that the utilitarian approach to forests as sources of timber supplies was only adopted by
the federal government after 1905, and that therefore the Court was wrong in denying water for
preservation purposes, even under its own primary purposes test. See 438 U.S. at 718-25 (Powell,
Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part); Fairfax & Tarlock, supra note 92, at 53436.
168. 438 U.S. at 702 (1978) (citation omitted).

169. Various western states have enacted laws which allow state governments to reserve waters
on behalf of the citizens of the states for conservation purposes, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92102 to 103 (1973 & Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1979); or to limit water diversions
that may endanger minimum flows, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (1980). See Tarlock, supra
note 25.
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statute or by common law case method to meet local needs as part of
their law of real property. 7 ° The case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch
Co. 171 indicated that the law of prior appropriation arose in Colorado
out of the necessity to use scarce water for irrigation on non-riparian
lands even before such rights were recognized by legislation and by the
state constitution. 172 Physical necessity seems to be the basis for the
assertion of state control over water.173 In the words of one
commentator,
Better results [than those based on spinning theories of
"ownership"] can be reached by sticking to what the Supreme
Court has said-that the government had power to dispose of
the water. It had that power in 1802, when Ohio became the
first state created out of the public domain, but it did not exercise it. Congress might have adopted a federal water law for
disposing of water rights . . . but it did not do so. As the
western public lands states were born, they took over the
function of establishing water rights by common law and statutes, as had been done in the 7original
thirteen states in which
4
there was no public domain. 1
However, advocates of expansive state jurisdiction, seeking to limit
federal ability to assert control of the limited supply of water of the
western states, have advanced other theories to preempt federal rights.
Each of these theories uses as a starting point the assumption that federal reserved rights are derived from the prior federal ownership of the
public domain. They maintain, however, that since the states succeeded to these property rights, the federal government retains no reserved rights.
One such theory espouses an undiluted reading of Caiffornia Oregon Power Co. 17 According to this reasoning, this case confirmed the
severance of all water owned by the federal government on the public
domain from common law riparian rights with the enactment of the
Desert Land Act of 1877. The states thereby assumed total jurisdiction
170.
branch
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Corker, supra note 91, at 501, stating, "Water law is not a discrete and separate
of the law, but is part of the law of real property."
6 Colo. 443 (1882). This case was the foundation of the Colorado doctrine.
Id. at 447.
See Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 345-47 (1909).
F. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 26 (3d ed. 1979) (quoting WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47,

at 147b).
175. As pointed out supra text accompanying note 82, those defending the federal proprietary
rationale prefer to limit the holding in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement
Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935) to its facts as a case concerning private parties, and not binding on
federal lands.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1982

33

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 1
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:1

of all such water. However, the impracticality of basing state rights on
the Act of 1877, for state rights advocates as well as for federalists, has
been pointed out. 176
Other theories for state jurisdiction over water are based on congressional assent to state constitutions claiming water within the state
as public or state property, 177 or simply based on the admission of
states into the Union. 17 8 Whatever the merits of these contentions,
under the proprietary rationale for federal reserved rights, they lose
their force if reserved rights are viewed merely as the exercise of federal
cannot restrict the subseconstitutional powers. State property claims
79
quent legislative authority of Congress.'
The most audacious state rights claim is based on the tenth
amendment.18 0 The early Supreme Court case of Kansas v. Colorado 8
intimated, in dictum, that the tenth amendment prevents federal legislation from overriding state water laws in order to provide water for
federal projects to irrigate private lands.' 8 2 Such constitutional interpretation has been described as "obsolete"'183 and it is clear from the
reclamation laws that Congress may displace state water law pursuant
to its constitutional powers, even with regard to the irrigation of private
lands.'

84

D. ImplicationsforEnergy Development
The restriction of federal claims to water in the West serves to preserve state control over waters within their boundaries and clarifies
state authority to issue permits for energy development. The federal
176. See supra text accompanying notes 95-105.
177. Merrill v. Bishop, 74 Wyo. 298,-, 287 P.2d 620, 624 (1955); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter,
9 Wyo. 110, -, 61 P. 258, 264 (1900). See Goldberg, Interaposition-Wild West Water S Yle, 17
STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-16 (1964) for a description and refutation of these theories.
178. The theory here derives from the "equal footing doctrine" that all states admitted after
the original thirteen may exercise the same types of jurisdiction as those original states. This
doctrine was used in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221-23, 228-30 (1845), to
justify state jurisdiction over the beds of navigable waters. The doctrine has been used to support
the claim that states assume jurisdiction over navigable waters when they enter the Union.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28, 57-58 (1894); see supra note 101.
179. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963).
180. The tenth amendment reserves to the states and the people any powers not delegated to
the United States nor prohibited to the states.
181. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
182. Id. at 85-93. In the recent case of California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), the
Supreme Court quotes Kansas Y. Colorado to bolster its arguments for state control over waters,
but significantly avoids any mention of the tenth amendment. Id. at 655.
183. Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 49, 63 (1964).
184. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958).
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threat in the past was, for the most part, more potential than real, but
this might not have continued to be true in the future.18 5 Even the
trivial claim involved in United States v. New Mexico would have inflicted hardship on at least one company appropriating under state

law. 186
However, there may be more direct ramifications with regard to oil
shale development. By executive orders in 1916 and 1924, three oil
87
shale reserves in Colorado were withdrawn for the use of the Navy.'
The Secretary of Energy is presently authorized to produce petroleum
from these reserves to meet the amounts currently needed for national
defense.' 8 8 It is arguable, therefore, that enough water is reserved
under the New Mexico decision for the primary purpose of the reservations, which is production for national defense.
In 1930, the President "temporarily" withdrew lands containing
deposits of oil shale "for purposes of investigation, examination and
classification."' 18 9 The direct purposes mentioned do not require much
water.' 90 Even if it is argued that leasing such lands to private companies for petroleum production is also a purpose of the withdrawal of
these lands, it would have to be a secondary purpose and therefore not
eligible for reserved water pursuant to the New Mexico rationale. Such
a conclusion would be reinforced by the invalidation in New Mexico of
federal reserved rights for stockwatering pursuant to grazing permits
issued to private persons. The Court stated that state law was "well
suited" for such private purposes.' 9 1 It may be concluded that the
Court would look with particular disfavor upon implying federal reserved rights for private purposes without a strong manifestation of
congressional intent.
III.

INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS TO WATER

Western state water advocates frequently make the contention that
federal and Indian rights must rise and fall together.' 92 Cases which
185. Boles & Elliott, supra note 161, at 230-35.
186. Id. at 221 n.61.
187. See Legislative History of Pub. L. No. 87-796, 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS
3151, 3152.
188. See 10 U.S.C. § 7423 (1976).
189. Exec. Order No. 5327, Apr. 15, 1930.
190. Holland, Mixing Oil and Water: The Effect of Prevailing Water Law Doctrines on Oil
Shale Development, 52 DEN. L.J. 657, 688 (1975).
191. 438 U.S. at 717.
192. See, e.g., the letter from the New Mexico State Engineer Office's General Counsel to the
U.S. General Accounting Office objecting to a preliminary draft of the GAO's Reserved Water
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discuss federal reserved rights inevitably refer to the Indian cases. 9 3
Yet the implied rights of Indian tribes to water necessary to fulfill the

purposes for which the reservations were set aside rest on much firmer
grounds than federal reserved rights. Arguably, Indian water rights

should be more broadly construed than federal rights. The Winters
doctrine, which originated in recognition of Indian reservation water

rights, was extended to federal reservations only belatedly by the
Supreme Court in Arizona v. Caifornia.194 The relative weakness of
the federal rights argument should not be allowed, through association,
to deprive the Indian peoples of their entitlements.
Indian water rights must be understood in the context of Indian

tribal sovereignty. Early Supreme Court cases held that although discovery gave European powers sovereignty over the land and necessarily diminished the rights of the native inhabitants as independent

peoples, these inhabitants still retained the right to occupy their aboriginal lands. 19 This treatment resulted in the concept that the United

States owns the Indian lands in fee, but the Indian tribes have rights of
96
occupancy and possession, called aboriginal title.1

Rights report, in COMPTROLLER GENERAL, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN NEED OF RESOLUTION 96-97 app. V (1978)

(report to Congress):
By distinguishing between Indian and non-Indian reservation doctrines, the report
suggests that there may be a doctrinal difference in determining the extent of the rights.
The Indians, of course, are now taking this position, but the alleged difference has never
been articulated in the cases. . . . As you might understand, the principle of "minimal
need" announced in Cappaert is anathema to the Indians; they prefer to urge upon the
courts a doctrine which gives to them the entire available supply, which they would then
transmute into a blank check drawn against existing non-Indian users and the federal
treasury.
Id.
193. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963).
194. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
195. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 503, 505 (1823).
196. Nadeau v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 253 U.S. 442, 445-46 (1920). Congress may recognize
Indian tribal title by treaty, agreement, or statute, in which case the Indian title becomes a "beneficial fee interest" and fully compensable. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
471-86 (1982) [hereinafter cited as F. COHEN 1982]. For a description of the various Indian titles,
see/d at 471-93. Indian title deriving solely from aboriginal possession or executive orders unrecognized by Congress is also considered to be equivalent to non-Indian fee simple title and compensable against states and private parties, although not against the United States. See id at 491.
The legal relationship between the United States and Indian tribes has been variously described. The federal government has been considered by the courts to be the guardian, United
States V. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178, 181
(1831), or trustee, Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942), of Indian welfare and property, and therefore has been obligated to protect Indian interests. Id. That it often
has not done so is common knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236
F.2d 321, 337 & n.23 (9th Cir. 1956).
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The Indian tribes have sovereignty over the individual lands of
their members as well as ownership of tribal land. 197 They may ex-

clude non-Indians from land under their jurisdiction or tax non-Indians on such land.' 98 Tribes, however, may not exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.' 9 9 Nor may they exercise regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians unless consensual relationships, such as

contracts, have been established between such non-Indians and the
tribes, or unless non-Indian conduct within the reservation "threatens
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."2 ' Of course, aside from a
tribe's inherent sovereignty, it may exercise any authority delegated to

it by the federal government.20 '
Although non-Indians may be excluded from tribal lands, once

they have been admitted, the state may exercise jurisdiction under certain circumstances.20 2 Tribal sovereignty, federal policy and interest,
and the state interest are weighed to determine whether state jurisdic-

tion applies.20 3 Congress, however, may explicitly authorize state
jurisdiction. 2
A.

IndividualIndian andNon-Indian Ownershiz'
of Land on Reservations

The pattern of landholdings on reservations is often a crazy quilt
of land held by tribes, individual Indians, and by non-Indians. Indian
tribes may have certain regulatory jurisdiction over individuals owning
197. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 50 (1934) (Solicitor Opinion).
198. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982).
199. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
200. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
201. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
202. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(upholding the rights of both the tribe and the state to tax the sale of cigarettes on the reservation
to non-Indians), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649
F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding the principle that states can require non-Indians to obtain
hunting and fishing licenses to pursue these activities on Indian lands, provided this does not
impose undue hardships on tribes). Of course, a state is precluded from regulating Indians on the
reservation or regulating reservation lands unless it can show some strong state interest in doing so
and federal law permits such regulation. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973) (state cannot impose an income tax on an Indian living on the reservation
whose income is derived from reservation sources, citing treaties and laws of the United States,
federal policy, and inherent tribal sovereignty to preempt state authority).
203. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracken, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980) (upholding federal
preemption of state taxation authority on non-Indian logging enterprise operating on tribal lands
as federal regulation of logging on Indian lands is pervasive).
204. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976) (permitting state taxation of mineral production on reservations); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982).
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their own land on the reservation in order to protect tribal interests. 20 5
The practice of allotting land to individual Indians originated in
treaties in which Indian tribes ceded land to the United States.20 6 If an
individual Indian or Indian family were living on a parcel of land, the
land often was reserved for that individual or family when the rest was
claimed by the United States. 20 7 Later, as the West was rapidly settled
after the Civil War, demands for Indian land increased. The federal
government responded to this demand by a policy of assimilation.
When the Indians ceded tribal lands, portions were set aside as reservations and allotted among Indian individuals and families to cultivate.
Non-allotted land on the reservations would be sold to non-Indian settlers to cultivate. The General Allotment Act of 1887208 authorized the
President to allot land in reservations for a trust period of twenty-five
years,20 9 or longer if the President should extend the period, during
which time the land could not be alienated. After the trust period, the
land was to be held in fee by the Indian allottees or their descendants.2 10 With regard to water available for irrigation and agriculture,
the Secretary of the Interior was "authorized to prescribe such rules
and regulations as he may deem necessary to secure a just and equal
distribution thereof among the Indians. ' ' 2 ' In addition, pursuant to
other laws, the federal government could sell
allotted lands at the death
2 12
heirs.
his
of
benefit
the
for
allottee
of the
The purpose of the allotment policy, according to its advocates,
was to civilize the nomadic Indian tribes by settling them as farmers
upon the land and to enhance the civilizing influences among those
Indians already engaged in agriculture by transferring title to land
from the Indian community to the individual. 1 3 The detractors of the
policy thought that it was a pretext allowing a land grab from Indians
by non-Indians.2 z 4 In any case, through a combination of selling "sur205. See supra text accompanying note 26. Note that reservation land, once declared such by
Congress, does not lose its status until a subsequent congressional enactment, even if it passes out
ofIndian ownership. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 962-64
(9th Cir. 1982).
206. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 206 (1942) [hereinafter cited as F. CoHEN 19421.
207. Id.

208. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1979).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at § 348.
Id.
Id. at §381.
Id. at §§ 372-373, 378.
See F. COHEN 1942, supra note 206, at 208.
Id. at 209 (quoting Sen. Teller).
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plus" lands, sales by allottees after the trust period expired, and sales
by the federal government for the benefit of heirs of allottees, the Indian landholdings were decreased from 138,000,000 acres in 1887 to
48,000,000 acres in 1934.215 In 1934, the allotment policy was reversed

by the Indian Reorganization Act216 which reestablished government
recognition of tribal powers by providing for tribal constitutions and
economic charters. Active government support for a policy of tribal
control over tribal resources and a policy of self-determination was

confirmed by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act of
1975.17 The policy of assimilation has therefore been discredited. It is
worthy of note that even at the height of the government's assimilation-

ist policies, the courts recognized the sovereignty of the tribes over their
own property.2 18
B.

Indian Water Rights

The case first defining Indian water rights was the 1908 case of
Winters v. United States.2 19 The case involved the diversion of water
from the Milk River above the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in

Montana by non-Indian settlers, pursuant to Montana law. The
United States brought suit to restrain the diversion in order to provide

adequate water for irrigating the reservation. The Supreme Court affirmed the granting of the injunction.
The Court based its conclusion on a construction of an agreement

between the United States and certain Indian tribes, ratified by Congress in 1888,220 under which the nomadic Indian tribes ceded much of
their land and were confirmed in the remainder as reservations. The
money to be paid for the ceded land, according to the agreement,

would be used to buy tools and implements the Indians needed to "en215. Id. at 216 (quoting report of Comm'r Collier to congressional committees in 1934).
216. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976). However, lands previously allotted remained in individual
ownership subject to the restrictions on alienation imposed by federal law. See F. COHEN 1982,
supra note 196, at 619-22.
217. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1976).
218. See Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding Chickasaws' right to charge a
permit tax to non-Indians using Chickasaw land); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905)
(upholding Creek Nation's right to impose a similar tax), appealdismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906);
Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W . 807 (Indian Terr. 1900) (upholding Creek Nation right to impose an
occupation tax on a non-Indian lawyer practicing within the Nation), aft'd, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir.
1900). See the discussion of these cases in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 894, 903906 (1982). But see id at 920-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (power to tax based on authority to
exclude non-Indians).
219. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
220. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113.
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able them to become self-supporting, as a pastoral and agricultural
people, and to educate their children in the paths of civilization."'2 2'
Among the reservations created under the agreement was the Fort Belknap Reservation.
From the agreement, two inferences were possible in regard to
water rights. Either the Indians reserved the quantity of water required
to develop the "arts of civilization" or the Indians ceded such waters.
The Court, relying on the rule that treaties and agreements are construed favorably to the Indians, had no trouble finding that the water
was reserved by the Indian tribes for their own uses.22 2
The case cannot be viewed as an affirmation of the Indians' riparian property rights since the Court refused to consider the government's argument based on those rights.2 23 Instead, the Court's decision
rested on an agreement between two sovereigns, the United States and
the Indian tribes.2 24
However, since the Indian tribes have no relation of comity with
the states, 225 the sovereign rights of the Indian tribes could be protected
against state claims only by asserting the supremacy of the agreement
as an act of Congress. Against Montana, the Court was confirming an
appropriation of water by the United States on behalf of the Indians, to
the extent needed by them. That appropriation precluded the applicability of state laws.22 6
Winters gave rise to the reserved rights doctrine by findfihg that
reservations of Indian land imply rights to use water flowing appurtenant to the land to the extent necessary to fulfill the purposes of the
reservation. Many of the cases involving such rights involve reservations established by treaties or agreements with 'Indians ratified by
Congress.227 In addition, such rights were extended to reservations cre221. Id. at 113.
222. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
223. Id. at 578. See also argument of appellants' lawyers, id. at 572. The court similarly
rejected the non-Indian settlers' argument that the subsequent admission of Montana repealed the
reservation of water, holding, "The power of the government to reserve the waters, and exempt
them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be." Id. at 577.
224. Id. at 575-78.
225. There is currently a bill pending in Congress to provide for state-tribal agreements for
mutual recognition of each other's laws. S.563, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S1532-33
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1981); see MutualAgreementsand CompactsRespecting Jurisdictionand Governmental Operations 1981: Hearings on S. 563 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
226. See Corker, supra note 91, at 504 ("The Winters v. UnitedStates case in 1908 is a 'reservation doctrine' case. It is also, and more appropriately, a prior appropriation case.").
227. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102
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228
ated by executive order.

Establishment of Indian and federal reservations by executive order was upheld in United States v. Midwest Oil Co.229 based on tacit
congressional consent to actions by the executive branch. However, the
implication of water rights from executive order reservations presents
two problems. Since no agreement or treaty exists with the Indian

tribe, no inference can be drawn as to the intentions of the parties to an
agreement concerning water rights. In addition, where there is no con-

gressional enactment authorizing a reservation for Indians, no unilateral intent can be attributed to Congress as to the reservation of water.
The Indian reserved rights doctrine has been described as federal

common law. 230 The aspect of the doctrine implying an appropriation
of water under executive order reservations appears to merit that

description. The implied intent of Congress to reserve Indian water
rights may be "a rule of law, an irrebuttable presumption," 2 3 ' but unlike federal reserved rights, which have been characterized similarly,

the use of such a legal fiction in these circumstances is eminently justifiable.2 32 An executive order reserving land on behalf of the Indians
S. Ct. 657 (1981); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1956);
Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831-32 (9th Cir. 1908); United States v. Adair, 478 F.
Supp. 336, 345 (D. Or. 1979).
228. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596 (1963); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 335 (9th Cir. 1939).
229. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
230. Morrison, Comments on Indian Water Rights, 41 MONT. L. REV. 39, 51 (1980).
231. P. MAXFIELD, M. DIETRICH & F. TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN

INDIAN LANDS 219 (1977) [hereinafter cited as P. MAXFIELD]. Congress probably did not contemplate the establishment of water rights in Indian tribes, but was not adverse to them once established. Compare the statute providing for allotments on the Blackfeet Reservations before the
final Winters adjudication: "[Tihe Indians, and the settlers on the surplus land, in the order
named, shall have a preference right for one year. . . to appropriate the waters. of the reservation
which shall be filed on and appropriated under the laws of the State of Montana .... " Act of
Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1035, with the statute relating to the Blackfeet Reservation
after the Winters litigation: "[T]he rights of the United States heretofore acquired, to water for
Indian lands referred to in the foregoing provisions, namely the Blackfeet. . . Reservation land,
shall be continued in full force and effect until the Indian title to such land is extinguished." Act
of May 18, 1916, ch. 125, § 11, 39 Stat. 123, 142. See also Ranquist, supra note 71, at 669 n.130
(concluding from the comparison that Congress did not intend to alter the Indian Winters rights
after they had been litigated). The establishment of rights in public land law through congressional acquiescence to executive action reserving such public land is well established. See United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471-74 (1915).
232. This is true, ironically, for the same reason that it was justifiable for the western territo-

ries and states to initiate their own water law systems prior to any congressional approval. Westem state water advocates maintain that the growth of state water law systems resulted from the
fact that water law is an element of property law that cannot be separated from the state laws
governing local lands, and there was no other jurisdictional authority capable of administering
this law. See Corker, supra note 91, at 501.
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necessarily involves questions pertaining to the water appurtenant to
that land, especially if the water body is shared by off-reservation appropriators. Since the state courts have questionable jurisdiction regarding Indian tribal property, 33 unless provided otherwise by
Congress, the federal courts were the only proper forums available for
Indian water adjudication. As there were no explicitly applicable water
law statutes, the federal courts were forced to construct a federal common law of water for Indian lands. The first case which dealt with
executive order reservations, United States v. Walker River Irrigation
District,2 34 adopted the Winters statutory interpretation of the United
States-Indian agreements as common law. Adopting that interpretation was reasonable because the Indians' need for irrigation water is the
same regardless of the circumstances by which their particular reservations were established.
It would be highly inequitable to interpret Indian reserved rights
narrowly based on recent decisions which constrict federal reserved
rights. With regard to federal reservations, federal agencies are merely
concerned with providing water for the immediate needs of largely
uninhabited federal lands. The federal government should have to pay
for its water appropriations as its needs develop, if no unappropriated
water is available, instead of relying upon the reserved rights doctrine
to give itself an artificially early priority date to avoid payment. Indian
reserved water rights, in contrast, are based on an historical recognition
of the needs of Indian tribes who exchanged their lands in order to
have sovereignty over a smaller area. Indian reserved water rights are
a vital element of the federal policy, dating from the early 1800's, recognizing tribal sovereignty and of the federal policy, dating from the
mid-1800's, encouraging Indians to adopt white civilization. To imply
water rights from agreements, statutory enactments, and executive or233. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 214, 243-45 (1832), the Supreme Court held that
the laws of Georgia can have no application on Indian reservations. These principles have been
modified, but the policy of restricting state sovereignty remains valid. See Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 219 (1959). Many western states are also subject to provisions in their enabling acts and
constitutions which disclaim title and jurisdiction to Indian lands. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1889,

ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (Enabling Act of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington); Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 569 (Enabling Act of New Mexico and Arizona);
MONT. CO ST. art. I; UTAH CONsT. art. III; Wyo. CO sT. art. 21, § 26. These provisions have
been held to disclaim state proprietary interests in Indian lands, Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 67-69 (1962), but their effect on state regulatory authority is disputed. See infra
text accompanying notes 294-98. However, since the early Winters rights cases developed the
framework for Indian proprietary rights in the context of federal statutory interpretation, such
matters were the proper concern of the federal courts.
234. 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
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ders and to rely on their priority dates in order to carry out those policies appears to be warranted.
The specific language of the Cappaert235 and New Mexico 2 36 decisions would not be contradicted by interpreting Indian rights broadly.
The Cappaertcase confines reserved rights to minimal needs, while the
New Mexico case restricts them to the primary purposes of the reservation. Arguably, with regard to Indian reservations, the minimal needs
of the tribes refers not to a subsistence level economy, but to the primary purpose of the reservation, putting the Indian tribes on a solid
economic footing similar to that of the white settlers.2 37 Uses of the
reservation land fulfilling this primary purpose deserve quantities of
water necessary for their implementation. Additionally, recognition of
a separate system of standards to govern such uses outside of state law
would be consistent with recognition of the Indian tribes as separate
sovereignties from the states.
C.

Uses and Quantitiesof Reserved Water

Much of the debate regarding reserved water uses revolves around
disputes as to the source of the reservation. One view holds that the
Indians reserved water appurtenant to the reservations for themselves
by treaty or agreement. Thus, water rights, "like the lands of which
they are a part, may be used for any beneficial purpose." '3 8 A second
view, finding that the United States reserved the water for the Indians,
identifies the uses to which water may be put more restrictively, basing
such uses upon the unilateral intent of the federal government.2 3 9
There is also a third possible position. Concededly, before any reservations were made, the Indians had sovereignty over the territory. Yet
235. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
236. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
237. In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1978), modfledsub nom Washington v. United States, 444 U.S. 816 (1979), the Supreme
Court upheld Indian rights to 45-50% of the fish passing through tribal fishing grounds in the
Pacific Northwest. In discussing the Winters line of cases, the Court stated that those cases upheld
an apportionment to the Indians "of enough water to meet their subsistence and cultivation
needs." 443 U.S. at 684. Later, however, the Court spoke of apportioning fish so that the "Indians' reasonable livelihood needs would be met." Id. at 685. The Court apparently did not mean
"subsistence" in its ordinary sense of barely keeping body and soul together, but rather sought to
prevent undue windfalls for the Indians. Considering the impoverished state of many tribes and
the considerable amount of capital required to make individuals productive in the advanced
American market economy, it is by no means clear that even broad interpretations of the reserved
rights doctrine will make anyone fabulously wealthy.
238. See Veeder, supra note 19, at 291.
239. See P. MAXFIELD, supra note 231, at 211-18 (discussing these two views).
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when the territory was opened to settlement, the waters flowing
through it had to be shared. The determination of the water remaining
under Indian sovereignty should be that quantity mutually contemplated by the Indian tribes and the United States, as expressed in their
agreements. This quantity would not, however, necessarily include
water for any beneficial use conceivable.
The Winters rights cases before Arizona v. California240 generally
dealt with Indian water needs for agriculture, 24 1 allocating water based
on immediate irrigation needs and often stipulating that Indian tribes
could later request more water when their agricultural needs expanded. 242 However, some cases also contain language to the effect
that the contemplated uses could extend beyond agriculture, grazing,
and domestic uses.2 43 The original agreement on which the court

rested its decision in Winters provides support for the contention that
the purposes of the reservation extend beyond providing an agricultural livelihood for the Indians. 2" Article III of that agreement provides money for procuring medical services for the Indians, as well as
for the "erection of such new agency and school buildings, mills, and
blacksmith, carpenter and wagon shops as may be necessary.

. .

and

in any other respect to promote their civilization, comfort, and improvement. ' '245 Article III continues: "[I]n the employment of farmers,
artisans, and laborers, preference shall in all cases be given to Indians
residing on the reservation who are well qualified for such position. . .

Such language evidenced Congress' intent that Indians

acquire skills equal to those of the surrounding settlers, rather than remain purely farmers dependent on the surrounding white settlement
for more advanced industrial services.
Since those early cases, three positions have evolved regarding the
uses and quantities of reserved rights. The most pro-Indian position is
that the Indian tribes have use of whatever quantity of water is neces240. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
241. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 475 (1973).

242. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 327-28 (9th Cir. 1956);
Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1908). But see United States v. Walker
River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 340 (9th Cir. 1939) (refusing to allow for flexibility by increasing Indians' quantum of water based on future needs).
243. See, e.g., Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1908) (Indians have

rights to water "to the extent reasonably necessary for the purposes of irrigation and stock raising,
and domestic and other useful purposes.").
244. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113, 114.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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sary for all beneficial uses,2 47 and that the tribes need not quantify their

claims until they are certain what these uses will be. Such claims presume a moratorium on certain non-Indian development in parts of the

West, including a moratorium on federal development of water resources, at least until Indian and non-Indian needs are assessed

through planning. Under this view, any local development would have
to be preceded by negotiations with the Indian tribes and individuals in
order to protect the unquantified water rights of the Indians.248

Although negotiations between Indian and non-Indian users
would appear to be necessary in any case to avoid excessive litigation, a

policy of restricting federal projects in the West pending completion of
extensive planning is unlikely to be adopted by the federal government.
The delay of quantification in the cases where tribes do not yet desire it

would continue the cloud on the water rights of non-Indian appropriators upstream or downstream from reservations into the indefinite future. In addition, it may be questionable whether the Indians are
entitled to water for all possible beneficial uses. Although it appears a

nineteenth century Congress intended to provide for the development
of light industry to service an agricultural economy, it is debatable
whether such intent can be stretched to include automatic reserved
rights for heavy industry, such as coal gasification or thermo-electric

generation. However, precedent exists for arguing that the reserved
rights doctrine incorporates water use for oil and gas development and
for water power development.2 49
247. See Veeder, supra note 19, at 290-91.
248. See NC4I to GAO: Legislative Quantpifation of Indian Water Rights is not the Answer,
supra note 29, at 35.
249. See P. MAXMIELD, supra note 231, at 227 (citing Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383
(D. Mont. 1968), for the former proposition and United States v. 5,677.94 Acres of Land, 162 F.
Supp. 108 (D. Mont. 1958), for the latter). In Tweedy, allotted land had been transferred to nonIndians, the surface being owned by plaintiff and the mineral rights by defendant oil company,
who used groundwater for oil and gas production. The court held that the allotment had reserved
rights as reservation land, but the tights were limited by need; since plaintiff manifested no need
for the water, the oil company could use it. 286 F. Supp. at 385-86. The court did not state the
source of defendant's water right. Arguably, it derived from the reserved water rights appurtenant
to the land, meaning that water may be reserved for mineral development. Acres ofLand granted
the Crow Tribe compensation for the water power value of condemned land taken for the Yellowtail Dam on the Bighorn River. 162 F. Supp. at 118-20.
The cases can be interpreted narrowly. Mineral development and water power development
are reasonable uses of lands properly situated. Therefore, there is a stronger argument that such
uses deserve reserved water rights in contrast to heavy industrial uses, such as thermo-electric
generation or coal gasification. These heavier uses are not site-bound and implying water rights
for these uses from the fact of reservation may be stretching the doctrine too far.
However, this analysis applies only to the particular use of the water as a basis for the quantification of the reserved rights. Once so quantified according to the original purposes of the reser-
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The second position holds that the Indians are only entitled to the
25 0
water needed for agriculture and subsistence at any particular time.
The problem with this position is that at the same time, non-Indian
settlers would appropriate surplus water for themselves, making it even
more difficult to dispossess them in favor of Indian tribes. Such a restriction would nullify the intent of Congress to allow Indian water
rights to develop on an equivalent basis with those of non-Indians, as
well as contravene the United States' judicial, legislative, and executive
policy of upholding the Indians' sovereignty over their reserved resources. A restriction of reserved rights to agricultural uses would unjustly deprive the Indian peoples of the means to develop mining,
municipal, and industrial activities. Uncertainty over the future availability of water would undermine a tribe's ability to plan for the future.
In Arizona v. California,25l the Supreme Court took a third approach and quantified the needs of five Indian reservations based on
their "practicably irrigable acreage. ' 25 2 The original intent of Congress, to facilitate the conversion of the Indian peoples to an agricultural way of life, was used as a standard for quantifying the amounts
controlled by the Indians, but that intent does not necessarily limit the
uses to which the water may be put. The Court did not specify that the
water had to be used for irrigation and the Master's Report, upon
which the Court based its conclusions on Indian rights, suggested that
such quantification "does not necessarily mean, however, that water reserved for Indian Reservations may not be used for purposes other than
agricultural and related uses." ' 3 The Supreme Court rejected Arizona's argument that water should be apportioned between Indians
and non-Indians based upon the foreseeable needs of the Indians and
the number of Indians upon the reservation, rather than upon irrigable
acreage, holding that the number of Indians and their future needs cannot be predicted.25 a This decision seems to eliminate objectionable feavation, arguably, the water could be used for other purposes. See infra text accompanying note
253.
250. See Shrago, EmergingIndian WaterRights: AnAnalysis of Recent Judclal.AndLegislailve
Developments, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1105, 1142-43 (1980).
251. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
252. Id. at 600.
253. Special Master's Report at 265 (1960), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
254. 373 U.S. at 600-01. See Shrago, supra note 250, at 1137-39, suggesting that the Supreme
Court has defacto reversed itself on the apportionment issue in Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), by upholding the concept that
resources should be apportioned according to actual needs at any particular time. By this logic,
the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard was made obsolete. However, the Court actually
relied on Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and made no intimation that it was dis-
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tures in the first two positions by quantifying the water to be
administered under Indian sovereignty while providing certainty to
non-Indian appropriators. In addition, the congressional purposes
when the reservations were established or ratified become the standards
for quantification, thereby limiting the potential breadth of the
doctrine.
255
The "primary purposes" holding of the New Mexico decision,
often cited as potentially limiting Indian water rights, 25 6 need not conflict with the means of evaluating reserved water rights enunciated in
Arizona, so long as courts recognize that the policy of the United States
is to recognize the sovereign rights of the Indian tribes to control
enough water for future needs of their people. Such a right of control
must be understood as an implicit primary purpose of each reservation,
so that the policies contemplated at the time of reservation are extended into the future in quantifying water rights.
D. PriorityDate of Reservation

The two theories of Indian reserved rights reach different theoretical results with regard to the priority dates of Indian reserved rights.
Those advocating the view that the Indians themselves reserved water
rights through their agreements conclude such rights have a priority
date of time immemorial.257 Others, preferring the theory that the federal government reserved the water, set the priority date at the date of
the reservation. Most of the cases which deal with the subject set the
date of priority at the date of reservation, 258 although exceptions octinguishing Washington Fishing Vessel. The "practicably irrigable acreage" standard has been
confirmed by the Ninth Circuit subsequent to the publication of Shrago's article. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1981). Washington FishingVessel concerned
treaty language which guaranteed Indian fishing rights "in common with all citizens" of the Pacific Northwest areas involved. 443 U.S. at 658. The language of the treaties therefore necessitated an equitable apportionment by the courts. Arizona v. Californiaalso apportioned resources,
in a manner of speaking, as water rights are always usufructuary. Therefore, the Supreme Court's
reliance uponArizona v. Californiaas precedent was not misplaced. However, the purposes of the
cases were different. Water use is bound up with economic development in the West. Its use
entails planning and investment, and changing uses may cause difficulty. In order to supply the
needs of the Indians, it would be necessary to allow them to plan for their future development, as
well as their present needs, which was what Arizona v. California sought to accomplish. By contrast, the control of fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest, based on conservation needs and the
development needs of tribal economies, can be done on a more short-term basis.
255. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
256. See Shrago, supra note 250, at 1138-39.
257. See Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1976, at 77, 87.
258. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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cur.259 In any case, the practical effect of this theoretical distinction
may not be of much consequence, as the establishment dates of many
Indian reservations predate most white settlement in most areas outside
of the Southwest.26
E. Leasing and Sale of Water Rights by Indian
Tribes andIndividuals
The reservation land leased by Indians to non-Indians carries with
it reserved water rights. 261 Allotted Indian lands retain a proportionate
share of reserved rights.262 When the allotted land passes into nonIndian ownership, the new owners are entitled to the amount of water
actually used by the former Indian owners, plus any additional amount
the new owners may put to use with reasonable diligence, 263 up to the
proportionate amount to which the transferor Indian allottees would
have been entitled.
Of particular relevance to energy development is the question of
whether Indian tribal or allotted reserved water rights may be transferred off the reservation independently of the land. The argument in
favor of such transfers rests upon the assumption that quantification
based upon the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard is accepted.
Once water rights are quantified, the argument proceeds, the Indians
should have the right to use the water for any beneficial use, including
leasing or selling the water independently of the land, in order to obtain money for economic development. 2 "
Two objections may be raised against such off-reservation uses.
First, water flows on and off the reservations are interconnected, and
set uses on the reservation will give rise to set return flows which may
be used downstream. Any change of water use to new off-reservation
uses may create hardships by displacing the return flows, especially if
the new off-reservation uses are industrial or energy related. These
259. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 345 (D. Or. 1979) (tribal water priority
dates for game and fish preservation were given a priority date of time immemorial since they

were traditional pursuits of the Indian tribe which the court held protected by treaty).
260. P. MAXFIELD, supra note 231, at 220-21.

261. See Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1921). This case dealt with the
leasing of allotted lands, but the logic of the case also applies to leasing of tribal land.
262. See United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 528-32 (1939).
263. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 50-51 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (E.D. Idaho 1928).
264. See Leaphart, Sale and Lease of Indian Water Rights, 33 MoNT. L. RaV. 266, 275-76

(1972). Congress may have to authorize such leasing. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) (prohibiting
conveyances of Indian property without congressional consent).
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uses, unlike agricultural ones, create no set pattern of return flows and
may create no return flows at all.
The other objection is that since the Indian reserved uses have
senior priority dates, these dates will transfer to the new water users off
the reservations. Such uses may disrupt the allocation pattern devised
under state law and may be resented as being inequitable, since vendees or lessees of Indian rights with senior priorities will have rights superior to other non-Indian users, despite the fact that the latter nonIndian users may have appropriated water long before the former
bought or leased their rights from the Indians. A rule has been recommended whereby a new Indian off-reservation use would be junior to
other uses already in place which would be injured by such a transfer
of Indian water rights,265 even if the Indian water rights, had they been
used on the reservation, would be senior to the non-Indian rights.
These two objections rest upon two assumptions: First, that reserved rights are akin to riparian rights and therefore the reasonable
266
needs of other users off the reservation must be taken into account
and, secondly, that the use of reserved rights for purposes such as sale
and leasing independently of the land will be costly to other appropriators. However, Indian reserved rights are neither riparian nor appropriative rights, as customarily understood, but are unique rights
designed to enhance the ability of the Indians to provide for their own
livelihood under their own sovereign authority. If anything, they resemble appropriative rights more than they do riparian rights. Western
states recognize that appropriative rights may be transferred independently of the land to which they are appurtenant 267 and there is no
reason why an analogous doctrine should not be applied to Indian reserved water rights to accomplish the fundamental purposes for which
these rights were developed.
The potential friction between Indian and non-Indian water users
is indeed serious and pervades the whole subject of water use in the
water-scarce West. There is no reason to believe that the adjustment of
Indian and non-Indian water uses will come cheaply. Certainly the
federal government and the states should take it upon themselves to
protect non-Indian water users, especially in light of the historical fed265. See Clyde, Special ConsiderationsInvolving Indian Rights, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 237,

250 (1975).
266. See Palma, Considerationsand Conclusions Concerning the Transferability ofIndian Water
Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 91, 94-95 (1980).
267. See Holland, supra note 190, at 679-80; Leaphart, supra note 264, at 274.
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eral involvement in encouraging western settlement and water development. Yet it is also reasonable to expect that such protection will take
the form of payment by the federal and state governments for the Indian rights tc -market water, rather than in the form of impositions of
artificial restrictions on Indian water use.
The report of the National Water Commission suggested the possibility of ameliorating friction between Indian and non-Indian users by
obligating the United States to lease, at the request of the Indian authorities, any unused Indian water rights on streams fully appropriated
by non-Indians. The Indian authorities would receive lease payments
from the United States which would be reimbursed only by those nonIndian users who had notice of Indian rights. The United States would
assume the payments on behalf of other non-Indian users.2 68
F. GroundwaterRights
There are substantial groundwater reservoirs in the Rocky Mountain states which will become increasingly important sources of water
for the region's energy development.2 69 Of particular significance is the
Madison Formation underlying parts of South Dakota and Wyoming
which may contain billions of acre-feet of useable water.y
The Cappaert271 case is sometimes cited as evidence that the Indian reserved rights doctrine extends to groundwater. However, Cappaert dealt with non-Indian reserved water rights. The Court also
specifically stated that the water had been expressly reserved by the
federal government and that the pool of water reserved was not
groundwater but surface water.272 Nevertheless, the case still has relevance in establishing implicit Indian reserved rights. The Supreme
Court cited the Winters line of cases as establishing the federal government's rights, thereby implying that the reserved rights doctrine applies
to underground water when connected to surface water.2 73
Congress appears to have recognized Indian claims to groundwater rights in 1978 when it passed Public Law 328 to settle the claims
268. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 241, at 480.
269. See Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels under the Appropriation Doctrine:
The Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 2 & n.8 (1981).
270. Comment, Application of the Winters Doctrine: Quant~fcatilon ofthe Madison Formation,
21 S.D.L. REv. 144, 144 n.1 (1976).
271. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
272. Id. at 140, 142.
273. Id. at 138-39.
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of the Ak-Chin Indian Community in Arizona. 274 The tribe had relied
on groundwater to irrigate its farmland and the federal government

was prepared to sue non-Indian groundwater appropriators in the surrounding area on behalf of the tribe for depleting the groundwater supply. In order to settle the Ak-Chins' claims, Congress agreed to fund
irrigation projects for the Indians.2 7 5 Another bill was passed in May,

1982 to settle the groundwater claims of the Papago Tribe in Arizona
276
by supplying them with water from the Central Arizona Project.
The rationale of the reserved rights doctrine, to provide water for

Indian economic development, would seem to apply to groundwater
and surface water alike. Indeed, it is increasingly recognized that, due

to the interconnection of groundwater and surface water in most hydrological systems, management of one source of water typically involves
management of the other.2 77
Here too, however, the fear arises of dormant Indian claims being
asserted to dispossess established non-Indian users. One effort aimed
at alleviating this problem is to treat groundwater in a fashion similar
to minerals such as oil and gas. 278 Groundwater would be apportioned

according to the ownership of the surface land. Alternatively, the
amount of water needed to recharge an underground aquifer could be

considered as "stock" and the rest as "surplus," with the surplus to be
used by the surface land owners on a reasonable use basis and the stock
to be apportioned by land ownership. 279

Although the suggestion has much to recommend it, it loses sight
of the underlying purpose of the reserved rights doctrine which is the

enhancement of Indian economic development. A water allocation system based on reasonable use could deprive Indians of much of the

groundwater reservoirs underlying adjoining reservation and non-res274. Act of July 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978).
275. Id.
276. H.R. 5118, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); see H.R. REP. No. 422, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). This bill was vetoed by the President, largely because of the financial burden it placed on
the federal government. 128 CoNG. REc. H3130 (daily ed. June 2, 1982) (statement of Pres. Reagan). There is another bill currently pending which would provide for the settlement of the
Papago Tribe's water claims. S. 1409, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 301-315, 128 CONG. REc. H7430-32
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 1982); see H. REP. No. 97-855, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H7425,
H7434-38 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1982).
277. Colorado has attempted to integrate groundwater and surface water rights to some extent.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Supp. 1981).
278. Note, Indian Claimsto Groundwater: ReservedRights or BenecialInterest?, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 103 (1980); see Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States,
13 LAND & WATER L. REv. 377, 388-89 (1978).
279. Note, supra note 278, at 124-25.
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ervation lands since the economic development of non-Indians is much
more advanced than that of the Indians and may reasonably support a
claim for much, if not all, of the groundwater in certain regions. The
establishment of such a claim would effectively preclude future Indian
development. Moreover, hydrology techniques do not necessarily allow for precise measurement of aquifer recharge levels.280 Consequently, it would be difficult to determine whether non-Indians were
confining themselves to surplus water or were depleting the stock of the
aquifer. Depletion of the groundwater stock would preclude future Indian uses until the groundwater stock were replenished.
Alternatively, measuring groundwater rights according to the proportion of Indian to non-Indian land overlying groundwater reservoirs
would impose an arbitrary limit on Indian water rights which may or
may not yield enough water for Indian economic development. It is
theoretically possible that the Indians could come out ahead under the
apportionment standard if their surface water rights were quantified
under the reserved rights standard of practicably irrigable acreage and
their reservation lay above a groundwater supply to which they would
be entitled independently of the reserved rights doctrine. This amount
of water could be greater than the amount of surface and groundwater
to which they would be entitled under the reserved rights standard.
However, as is more likely in the arid Rocky Mountain states, an Indian tribe may well be unable to obtain all of its Winters rights from
surface sources. If the apportionment method were used in that situation, there would be no assurance that the Indian tribe would get its full
" ' To accomplish the purposes of the Winquantity of Winters rights.28
ters doctrine, the Indians should be allowed to draw from both surface
and groundwater sources to obtain their full quantity of reserved rights
regardless of the size of the reservation's surface area overlying the aquifer. As with all Indian reserved rights, the federal and state governments have an obligation to protect pre-existing non-Indian uses by
280. Grant, supra note 269, at 7.
281. For example, hypothesize a tribe entitled to X acre-feet of water under the Winters doctrine. Assume also that there are IhX acre-feet of water in surface streams, 1/X acre-feet in underground aquifers, and that one half of the ground area of the reservation lies atop the aquifers. If
the Winters doctrine includes groundwater, the tribe would get the full amount to which it is
entitled per Winters. If groundwater is not considered in the Winters calculations, and is instead
apportioned by surface area, the tribe would get: IAX acre-feet (from the surface streams under
the Winters doctrine) plus 1/X acre-feet (from the underground aquifiers under the separate apportionment system) for a total of X acre-feet. Of course, if the tribe could get all its Winters
rights from surface streams, then treatment of groundwater as a captured mineral like oil and gas
would yield an extra 1/X feet for the tribe.
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buying out the non-Indian users on behalf of the Indians. Alternatively, when the Indians agree to sell their reserved rights, the pre-existing rights may be protected by paying the Indians the market value
of the rights.
G.

The McCarranAmendment

The states in the Upper Colorado and the Upper Missouri River
Basins have enacted statutes which provide systems for adjudicating
water rights in state courts. 82 But there is some confusion because federal courts have authority to adjudicate Indian and federal water
claims. As a result, in some cases, both courts have jurisdiction. This
confusion delays the process of confirming water rights, which makes it
more difficult for the states, Indian tribes, and energy companies to negotiate with each other for water rights.
Indian tribes as well as the United States are covered by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 83 The McCarran Amendment2 8 4 waives
the United States' sovereign immunity, permitting joinder of the
United States in state water law adjudications involving river systems.
This Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to allow
joinder not only in claims involving federal rights acquired pursuant to
state law but also in those claims which involve federal reserved
rights.2 85
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States28 6
the Supreme Court held that the McCarran Amendment permitted
state adjudication of Indian reserved rights. 2 87 The Court assumed
in that case that state adjudication of Indian rights would not be injurious to Indian rights because the McCarran Amendment "in no way
abridges any substantive claim on behalf of Indians under the doctrine
of reserved rights." 28 8 In support of this contention, the Court noted
282. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-251 to -260 (West Supp. 1981-1982); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211 to -243
(1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-1 to -20 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-16 to -17 (1960);
S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 46-10-1 to -26 (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1980);
Wyo.STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977).
283. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978); California ex rel California
Dep't of Fish & Game v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 595 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1979).
284. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
285. United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529 (1971); United
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
286. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
287. .d. at 809-13.
288. Id. at 813.
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that any final state decision could be appealed from the state court system to the United States Supreme Court.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a federal district
court could dismiss a case involving federal and Indian water rights in
deference to a state action when the state action, which had been filed
after the federal action, involved the same rights. The Court held that
the federal court retained jurisdiction over federal and Indian water
claims under federal law28 9 and that state and federal jurisdiction were
concurrent, but that the dismissal was proper anyway. The Court reasoned that the state court had jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment and that deference to the state's water-rights adjudication
procedures was an exercise of "wise judicial administration." '
The practical effects of the Court's decision concerning the McCarran Amendment may be mixed. Considering the restricted scope of
federal non-Indian reserved rights and their potential for disrupting
state water rights schemes, it is wiser to allow the state to integrate
those federal claims with state claims, especially since Congress has not
attempted to set up a separate federal water law system.
However, federal policy has always been to acquiesce to a water
law system independent of state law to deal with the Indian tribes'
water rights. The Supreme Court's implicit presumption in the Colorado River case is that the standards for determining Winters substantive rights are clear, and that the state courts would merely be applying
them to particular circumstances. However, the extent and nature of
Winters rights are still being litigated, and the effect of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Colorado River is to allow the state courts to define
these rights at the trial stage. The states have historically been reluctant to recognize Indian claims and there is an inevitable conflict of
interest between the states and the Indian tribes, in that states may seek
to restrict Indian rights to leave more water within state jurisdiction.2 9 1
Further, the states have traditionally exhibited animosity toward Indians.292 Some commentators have stated that this problem should be
avoided by leaving adjudication of Indian rights exclusively with the
federal courts.29 3
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1976) provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil matters
brought by the federal government.
290. 424 U.S. at 818.
291. One commentator notes the susceptibility of elected state judges to pressure, especially
against Indians. Corker, supra note 91, at 504-05.
292. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
293. E.g., NAT'L WATER COMM'I,supra note 241, at 478-79.
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Three opinions recently issued by the Ninth Circuit would narrow
the scope of state jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment: Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit,2 94 San CarlosApache Tribe v. Arizona,295
and Navajo Nation v. United States.2 9 6 In these cases, federal district

court judges, relying on ColoradoRiver, had dismissed actions in favor
of state court proceedings which had been brought to adjudicate federal and Indian water rights. The Ninth Circuit reversed each of the
three cases on the grounds that provisions in the Arizona and Montana
Enabling Acts and Constitutions disclaiming jurisdiction over Indian
lands prevented assertion of state jurisdiction over Indian water
cases. 297 The alternative grounds in theAdsit case, and possibly in the
San Carlos case, were that the facts of the cases were not analogous to
Colorado River since "wise judicial administration" did not require
deference to state adjudicatory procedure in those cases.298
In the Adsit decision, the appellate court held that Montana's jurisdiction over Indian water rights requires personal jurisdiction as well as
subject matter jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over Indian rights
may have been conferred by the McCarran Amendment, but subject
matter jurisdiction had been disclaimed by the Enabling Act of Montana 299 and by the Montana Constitution. The Enabling Act states:
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States
300

294.
295.
296.
297.
1102.
298.
299.

668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982).
668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1982).
668 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1982).
Adst, 668 F.2d at 1084-87, 1090; San Carlos, 668 F.2d at 1097-98; Navajo, 668 F.2d at
Adsit, 668 F.2d at 1087; San Carlos, 668 F.2d at 1098.
The Enabling Act also disclaims subject matter jurisdiction for North Dakota, South

Dakota, and Washington as well as Montana.
300. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677. The Enabling Act of Arizona and
New Mexico contains a similar provision. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 558-59,
569. The San Carlos and Navajo cases were decided pursuant to the latter provision. See San
Carlos, 668 F.2d at 1097; Navajo, 668 F.2d at 1102.
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The 1972 Constitution of Montana incorporates this provision. 30 1
Therefore, according to the court, Montana lacked jurisdiction over Indian water rights, notwithstanding the McCarran Amendment.
In a 1981 case which validated the state's limited right to license
non-Indian hunting on Indian lands, the Ninth Circuit stated, "Enabling Acts themselves forced states to disclaim only their proprietary
interest in Indian land, not the states' governmental or regulatory authority over that land. ' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit, in a case which confirmed the state's right to adjudicate Indian claims under the McCarran
Amendment, 3 3 relied upon similar reasoning in holding that such disclaimer provisions disclaim only state proprietary interests in the land
and that the McCarran Amendment had a regulatory rather than a proprietary intent in subjecting Indian claims to state jurisdiction.3 04
In the Adsit decision, the Ninth Circuit ignored its own precedent
and disagreed with the Tenth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that
cases which had previously been relied upon by both the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits dealt with state jurisdiction over limited non-Indian
conduct on reservations, such as hunting and fishing, and that adjudicating water rights was a much more serious issue to the Indians.
Therefore, different principles would apply and the disclaimers were
effective with regard to water litigation.
Although the observation of the court as to the seriousness of
water rights was no doubt correct, its reasoning was obscure. The court
did not question its own prior holdings that a state's disclaimer provisions merely referred to state proprietary claims nor did it dispute that
the proceedings before it were regulatory proceedings. The court's distinctions based on the subject matter of the state regulation would appear irrelevant. The disclaimer provisions do not distinguish between
regulatory issues having great import for Indians and those which do
not; the provisions do not purport to waive state jurisdiction only in the
former situation while retaining it in the latter. State regulatory authority may be preempted pursuant to federal law or federal policy
301. MONT. CONST. art I.
302. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) (following
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 67-69 (1962)).
303. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
995 (1979).
304. 601 F.2d at 1128-36. Note that the Tenth Circuit was dealing with the New Mexico
disclaimer provision, which is the same as that of Arizona. Both states were covered by the same
act. Yet the Ninth Circuit interpreted the same language differently as applied to Arizona in the
San Carlos case.
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which upholds tribal sovereignty, °5 but arguably the disclaimer provisions alone are not strong enough to withstand explicit congressional
directives recognizing state jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, an argument can be made that the Tenth Circuit was
incorrect in describing the McCarran Amendment adjudications as regulatory procedures. In fact, such adjudications subject Indian proprietary claims to state adjudication because the Winters rights of the
Indians are still unsettled and restrictive state interpretations of the
doctrine would deprive Indians of property rights. The line between
police power regulation and the taking of property is thin indeed 30 6 and
the confused state of western water law does not inspire confidence that
the line will not be crossed. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit was attempting
to invoke this rationale in speaking of the seriousness of water rights
for the Indians, but did not wish to state it explicitly, since such a rationale would appear contrary to the Supreme Court's statement in the
ColoradoRiver case that substantive Indian water rights would not be
affected in state water adjudications.
TheAdsit holding does not directly contradict that of the Supreme
Court in Colorado River since Colorado does not have a disclaimer
provision in its enabling act or constitution. However, the reasoning of
Adsit would preclude application of the McCarran Amendment to
many of the western states for which it was intended because most of
these states do have disclaimer provisions.307 The Adsit court provided
an escape from this predicament by holding that subject matter jurisdiction over Indians could be acquired if such a state repealed its disclaimer provision with the consent of the Indian tribes under the
procedures of Public Law 83-280 as amended. 30 8 The court intimated
that had Montana availed itself of these procedures, it could have proceeded with its water law adjudication. 3 9 However, this reasoning is
somewhat confusing in light of the assertion by the court at the begin305. See supra text accompanying notes 197-204 & 283-90 for a discussion of tribal

sovereignty.
306. Cases dealing with land use management evidence the delicate balancing of interests
required to determine whether a particular case is a compensable taking of property under the
fifth amendment or an exercise of the police power. See generally Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahan, 260 U.S. 393 (1922);
Fred French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).

307. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text.
308. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, § 2, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18

U.S.C. § 1162 (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980));
668 F.2d at 1085.
309. See 668 F.2d at 1085-87.
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ning of the opinion that this body of laws specifically excludes water
rights from the ambit of Indian matters over which states may acquire
civil jurisdiction.31° In effect, then, if the disclaimer provisions are interpreted to preclude subject matter jurisdiction, there would be no way
to effectuate the intent of the McCarran Amendment in much of the
West. Such a situation would seem to frustrate the will of Congress in
enacting the Amendment, assuming that it was intended to apply to
Indian water rights.
The result reached in Adsit is preferable to the result reached by
the Supreme Court in Colorado River, however, since it would help
restrict consideration of Indian claims to the federal courts, which generally have far more expertise on Indian matters than state courts.
Confining such adjudications to the federal courts would also have the
advantage of eliminating the race to the courthouse by the various parties to preclude or establish federal jurisdiction, as well as the delay in
reaching the merits of the water adjudications due to the profusion of
cases in federal and state courts litigating the forum issue. The adjudication of Indian claims solely in federal court would not result in inefficiency because the determinations of the federal courts could be
immediately recorded in the state systems pursuant to the recommendation of the National Water Commission.3 1 ' It may be surmised,
from the fact that Congress did not rescind the federal courts' jurisdiction over Indian rights altogether when it passed the McCarran
Amendment, that Congress did not consider federal adjudication of Indian rights to be inefficient even when all other rights to a river system
are adjudicated by a state court.312
The conflict over state jurisdiction between the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits will eventually have to be resolved by the Supreme Court. Although the Ninth Circuit decisions produced beneficial results, these
results could have been reached by a more direct and coherent route
than that taken by the court. However, for the Supreme Court to
achieve these results, it would have to embrace arguments which were
rejected in ColoradoRiver. For instance, the Court would have to find
that the McCarran Amendment will affect the substantive rights of the
Indian tribes and individuals if applied to them and that such an application is unwarranted because the statute does not explicitly mention
310. Id. at 1083.
311. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 241, at 478.
312. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809, 813

(1976).
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Indian rights.3" 3 In the absence of clear language conferring state jurisdiction over these rights, the federal courts are warranted in applying
the rule that statutory ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the
Indians 314 in denying the states jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian property rights.
H. Indian Jurisdictionover Non-Indian Water Users
on Reservation Lands
The Indian tribes, of course, have jurisdiction and regulatory
power over waters which are adjudged to be reserved for their use, and
the Department of the Interior has proposed rules which would establish procedures to guide such regulation. 315 However, a particularly
knotty problem in clarifying Indian water rights, as well as tribal sovereignty, is the determination of Indian jurisdiction and regulatory power
over non-reserved waters appurtenant to reservation lands, denoted
here as "excess" waters, which are used under state permit by nonIndian successors to the Indian allottees. Since some reservations contain substantial amounts of land which are owned by non-Indians, such
considerations could be important in determining water allocations.
One consideration in this context is the extent of the Indian tribes'
inability to control reserved water use on their reservations and tribal
lands due to their lack of authority to control non-reserved waters.
"Reserved" and "non-reserved" waters are merely arbitrary legal terms
which differentiate quantities within the same body of water. Proper
water use management would likely combine the management of both
types of water. Moreover, water management is typically. connected
with proper land management, the combination of which includes provisions for ditches, irrigation works, and rights of way. Proper management of tribal lands may require that the Indians regulate excess water
belonging to non-Indians.
The opposite consideration is that if tribes are granted jurisdiction
over non-Indian state water rights, they would have the power to abrogate the substantive rights of the non-Indians. No "full faith and
313. See Elliott & Balcomb, Deference to State Courts in the Adjudication of Reserved Water
Rights, 53 DEN. L.J. 643, 655 (1976) (arguments of Indian groups that in light of the policy against
state jurisdiction over Indian matters and in view of the fact that the Amendment does not mention Indian rights, the Amendment should not be interpreted to give the states such jurisdiction).
314. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (applying rule to agreements
and treaties); see also DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975) (congressional

intent to terminate a reservation).
315. 46 Fed. Reg. 944 (1981).
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credit"" 6' or comity arrangement exists between the states and the Indian tribes to guarantee tribal enforcement of substantive state water
rights on the reservation. 1 7 The Ninth Circuit cut this Gordian knot
by nullifying long-established state water rights by judicial fiat based
on federalist notions that state water law cannot be applied to Indian
reservations.
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,"'8 Walton, a non-Indian, acquired land in Washington which had originally been allotted
to Indians on the Colville Reservation in 1917. s' Walton sought to
draw water from an adjacent creek and claimed reserved rights as the
successor to the Indian allottees, as well as water rights under state permits. The federal district court held that Walton was not entitled to
any Winters-derived rights except the quantity of water that Walton's
Indian predecessor had actually appropriated. Furthermore, the priority date would be the date of the predecessors' actual use of the water,
not the date of reservation. However, there was excess non-reserved
water in the creek which the court held was properly appropriated by
Walton under state law. The court noted that in times of shortage the
reserved rights still held by the Indian tribe would be superior to those
acquired by appropriation under state law. The Indian rights had priority dates as of the date the reservation was set aside, whereas Walton's state-derived rights0 had a priority date as of their filing and
certification in 1948-49.32
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court on the issue
of Walton's reserved rights. The court held that a non-Indian successor
to allotted land is entitled to the reserved water actually used by his
Indian predecessor plus that amount of reserved water he can put to
use with reasonable diligence after the acquisition of title, up to the
pro-rata share of the reservation's reserved water. The pro-rata share is
based on the proportion of irrigable land he owns to the total irrigable
land in the watershed on the reservation. The priority date is the same
as that for all reserved water, but unlike reserved water rights held by
Indians, the right is not kept open indefinitely, but rather is forfeited if
316. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 applies this concept only to states.

317. Legislation currently pending in Congress would provide for arrangements of comity between tribes and states. S. 563, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See supra note 225.
318. 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978), a7'd inpart rev'd inpart & remanded, 647 F.2d 42

(9th Cir. 1981).
319. 460 F. Supp. at 1324-25.
320. Id. at 1331-32.
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the water is not appropriated within a reasonable time.3a'
The appellate court also reversed the district court on the matter of
state jurisdiction. It ruled that state permits for excess water are of "no
force and effect" on the reservation. 322 The court did note, however,
that the water basin in question was completely within the boundaries
of the reservation and that state water rights off the reservation would
not be affected. The court reserved judgment on the legitimacy of state
jurisdiction where off-reservation state rights are affected.323
The reasoning of the court may be disputed. The appellate court
relied on the fallacy that state water law is derived from congressional
enactments and intentions to defer to state water law, 324 and concluded
that no such deference is applicable to reservations. 325 However, as
noted above, Congress never enacted a water law for the states. The
states assumed their jurisdiction326by default, which was only subsequently recognized by Congress.
The court also relied on the Washington Enabling Act327 which
disclaims state jurisdiction over Indian lands.328 However, the disclaimer provision in that Act does not provide direct support for the
court's position. The Act disclaims jurisdiction over "all lands ...
owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes. 329 Thus, arguably, reserved water rights are included in "lands owned by Indian tribes"
under property law, since they are appurtenant to those lands. However, excess waters are not so owned, and therefore should not be subject to the disclaimer.
The arbitrariness of the court's position is evident when one considers an extension of the court's reasoning to the hypothetical which
the court had sought to avoid, Indian or federal regulation of excess
waters on the reservation which affects the rights of state water rights
holders off the reservation. For example, the use of excess water by a
non-Indian who owns reservation land may result in a certain quantity
of return flows to property holders off the reservation who have ob321. 647 F.2d at 51.

322. Id. at 53.
323. Id. at 52-53.

324. Id.
325. Id.
326. See supra text accompanying note 204.
327. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676. This Act also includes Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
328. 647 F.2d at 53.
329. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 677.
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tained their rights pursuant to state law. An incident may arise in
which Indian or federal regulation of excess waters results in the cut-off
of return flows to those holders of state water rights. In such a case, the
Ninth Circuit could apply its analysis in the Colville andAdsit cases to
preclude state interference in water regulation on the reservation based
on the disclaimer clauses or on its interpretation of federal water law.
Such a holding, however, would result in the automatic loss of the substantive rights of those holding state water rights off the reservation, a
result which a court would probably not want to reach without further
analysis.
A better method of dealing with this problem is to analyze the
situation in accordance with the tests laid down by the Supreme Court
by the Ninth
in White MountainApache Tribe v. Bracker3 30 and applied
Circuit in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona.33 ' The Supreme

Court stated:
When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is
at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest
in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest ...
More difficult questions arise where, as here, a State asserts
authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity
on the reservation. In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of
both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of
tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on
mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an
inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.332
In the situation of non-Indian use of excess water on a reservation,
the analysis would proceed as follows. The Indian tribes have a sovereign interest in regulating the lands and reserved waters which they
own on the reservation. State ability to enter the reservation and regulate, even if confined to excess waters, could disrupt the efficient management of tribal resources. To the extent that the disclaimer
330. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
331. 649 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1981).
332. 448 U.S. at 144-45.
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provisions in state enabling acts protect Indian land and water proprietary rights from state jurisdiction, these acts may provide support for
further measures to protect such property from indirect diminution by
adverse state regulation.
The federal government, like the tribes themselves, has an interest
in assuring tribal sovereignty. However, the federal government also
has an interest in protecting the rights of the non-Indian successors of
the Indian allottees. The allotment policy pursuant to which much reservation land was originally allotted to Indians, and later transferred to
non-Indians, was also a federal policy, although it has since been abandoned. Reservation lands not allotted to Indians were opened to nonIndian settlers by the federal government. The General Allotment Act
manifested an intention to provide water for the Indian allottees by
stipulating that a ' just and equal distribution" of water be made
among Indian allottees pursuant to regulations by the Interior Secretary.333 Other laws provided for the acquisition of water rights on reservations
by Indian allottees and non-Indian settlers pursuant to state
4
law.

33

The laws passed by Congress have never provided a federal water
law system. The reserved rights doctrine grew up as a part of Indian
law and the extent of its applicability to the rights of non-Indian successors to Indian allottees was not certain. Although the Supreme
Court held as early as 1939 that these settlers did have some right to
reserved waters, the Court failed to fully define the precise nature of
these rights.335 In the absence of a system of federal water law, nonIndian settlers would of necessity have had to rely on state water law as
the only operative law under which they could obtain water rights. Assertions of Indian sovereign rights to regulate excess water within reservation boundaries is a fairly recent development.
Lastly, a state has an interest in regulating water rights acquired
pursuant to its own laws, as well as in regulating water on reservations
which affects the ability of the state to manage water development of
streams flowing off the reservations.336
Therefore, it appears that states and Indian tribes have analogous
claims to regulating excess water on reservation lands. The Indian
333.
334.
335.
336.
federal

25 U.S.C. § 381 (1979).
Eg., Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 24 Stat. 1015, 1035.
United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1939).
Corker, supra note 91, at 501 (discussing the relative competence of the state and the
governments to administer local water law).
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tribes have an interest in protecting the reserved waters to which they
are entitled, and the states would want to safeguard the off-reservation
waters which they administer. The Indian tribes would, of course, have
the pre-eminent claim in exercising sovereignty on reservation lands,
just as states may not be interfered with in the exercise of their sovereignty off the reservations.337 This by no means implies, however, that
substantive rights acquired under state law should not be enforced by
tribes. The optimal solution would be an arrangement whereby the
states and tribes agree to enforce each other's laws. A bill to permit
states and tribes to enter into. such compacts is currently before Congress.338 In the absence of such an arrangement, a court appointed
water master may protect the state substantive rights of non-Indians on
reservations while otherwise permitting tribal regulatory authority over
reserved water.
I. Imfplicationsfor Energy Deielopment

The tribal reservations in the Rocky Mountain area were generally
established for agricultural purposes. 339 The area of reservation land in
this region is also quite large. If the irrigable acreage standard is generally adopted 340 with the proviso that the water uses are not restricted to
agricultural uses, the tribes of that region are likely to have control over
substantial amounts of water.
For example, the reservations of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe
and the Crow Tribe lie on the Tongue and Bighorn Rivers, respectively, in the coal country of southeastern Montana. One study has
estimated that quantified water rights of the Northern Cheyenne may
ultimately be between 150,000 and 300,000 acre-feet annually. 341 The
study concludes: "The increase in agricultural development through
irrigation on the Northern Cheyenne Reservation would represent a
significant depletion of the Tongue River water. ' 342 However, not all
the potentially irrigable acreage is likely to be utilized, so actual diver337. E.g., Mescalero Apache Tribes v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 147-55 (1973) (tribal enterprise off

the reservation may be taxed by state).
338. S. 563, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). See supra note 225.
339. E.., Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016 (allotting land on the Wind River Reservation in Wyoming); Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (establishing Blackfeet and Fort
Belknap Reservations).
340. To date, the standard has only been adopted in a limited number of cases, but those cases
serve as powerful precedents. See, e.g, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963); Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1981).
341. C. Bores & J. KRUMLLA, supra note 1, at 149-50.
342. Id. at 150.
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sion of water is likely to be substantially less in the near future unless
the water is used for other purposes. The same study estimates that the
Crow Tribe's potential claims may be as much as 400,000 acre-feet annually from the Bighorn River, Little Bighorn River, and Pryor Creek.
Diversion of these waters would also seriously affect non-Indian users,
were it completely utilized. 4 3 The large Wind River Reservation in
Wyoming is also claiming water from the Wind River, which is part of
the Bighorn River system."
Indian tribes also have rights to water on other parts of the Missouri River drainage basin which will affect water availability for offreservation energy development, such as water for coal gasification,
coal liquefaction, and cooling thermo-electric plants. For example, the
planned American Natural Gas Coal Gasification Company coal gasification plant in North Dakota will draw water from the Garrison Res345
ervoir (Lake Sakakawea) which is located on the Missouri River.
Reservations which are situated along the mainstem of the Missouri
River include the Standing Rock Indian Reservation, the Cheyenne
River Indian Reservation, and the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in
the Dakotas and the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana.
Some of the richest oil shale deposits are to be found in the Green
River basin, a tributary of the Colorado River. This river traverses the
Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation in Utah.
The largest reservation in the United States is the Navajo Reservation, which is adjacent to the mainstem of the Colorado River and traverses the Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins. In addition, the
San Juan River, which is a tributary of the Upper Colorado River in
Arizona and New Mexico, and the Little Colorado River, a tributary of
the Lower Colorado River, are appurtenant to the Reservation. One
commentator has estimated that based upon the irrigable acreage standard, tribal water rights may ultimately amount to two million acrefeet of water per year or more.34 6
343. Id. at 152.
344. See In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys.
and All Other Sources, Civ. No. 4993 (Wyo. Dist. Ct., 5th Dist., filed Jan. 24, 1977); see generally,
Comment, McCarran .4mendment General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Problems, 16
LAND & WATER L. REV. 53 (1981) (using the facts of Big Horn River Sys. as an example in

discussing problems and solutions in actions pursuant to Wyo. STAT. § 1-37-106 (1977)). For an
estimate of the possible amount of diversion by the Wind River Tribes, see C. Bopus & J. Ka uTILLA, supra note I, at 82-86.
345. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at 70.
346. Back & Taylor, Navajo Water Rights: Pulling the Plug on the Colorado River?, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 71, 74 (1980).
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Even in the present confused state of the law, it has been considered necessary to obtain the consent of Indian tribes to defer the exercise of their water rights before commencing water projects. For
example, the Ute Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation entered
into an agreement with the United States Bureau of Reclamation and
the Central Utah Water Conservancy District in 1965, which was endorsed by the governor of Utah, to defer their use of'water rights during the construction of the Central Utah Project in return for the
development of water for the Tribe as part of the Project.3 47 In 1968,
the Navajo Tribe, in return for certain promises of economic development, passed a resolution limiting for a period of time its claims to
water allocated to Arizona under the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact.3 48 The agreement permitted part of that water to be used for
a power plant to be located on the reservation.349
Assuming the adoption of the irrigable acreage standard to quantify water rights for all reservations set aside for agricultural purposes,
the issue remains whether the Indian tribes or the allottees may allocate
reserved water to industrial or energy firms establishing projects on reservation lands and whether reserved water may be leased or sold to
these concerns off the reservation.
Any limitation of reserved rights to agricultural uses would leave
the Indian tribes at a disadvantage in negotiating with the Bureau of
Reclamation and the states, as much of the reservation land may not be
35 0
irrigable without the construction of government irrigation projects.
The lease or sale of the water to energy companies would provide an
alternate use for the water, possibly strengthening the Indians' bargaining position. In addition, in certain areas where agriculture may not be
the best use for water, a forced use would create a misallocation of
resources. For example, the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, authorized in 1962, was to afford 508,000 acre-feet per year for irrigation on
347. Boyden & Pugsley, Use ofIndian Water in Developing MineralProperty, in W'lATER AcQUISITION FOR MINERAL DEVELOPMENT 5-1, 5-21 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral Law Found. ed. 1978).

348. The Compact was negotiated in 1948 and approved by Congress in 1949. Act of Apr. 6,
1949, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 43 U.S.C. § 617/ note (1976). The text of the Compact is set forth at 63
Stat. 31, 31-43.
349. Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice: Nava Experience in
the ColoradoRiverBasin, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1976, at 97, 109-19. There is some

question as to the validity of this resolution, however. See Back & Taylor, supra note 346, at 8788.
350. See, e.g., Price & Weatherford, supra note 349, at 119-31 (discussing the Navajo Indian
Irrigation Project).
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family farms .3 5 However, after second thoughts, proposals have been

made for using the water for industrial and energy purposes instead. 35 2
Therefore, the adoption of the viewpoint that reserved water may
be used for non-agricultural uses appears to be warranted. 53 If it becomes accepted that reserved water can be used for these purposes,
then energy companies could acquire the water by leasing land from
Indian tribes, from Indian allottees, or from non-Indian successors to
allottees for the purpose of developing minerals or building energy facilities.3 54 Energy companies may also buy land held by non-Indian
successors to allottees.355
Claims that reserved water may be leased or sold to energy companies for use beyond the boundaries of Indian land may well be highly
controversial. However, such claims could be justified by reference to
the underlying purpose of the reserved rights doctrine, which is to provide for Indian economic development.356
IV.

RECLAMATION LAWS

There is still a substantial quantity of unappropriated water in federal reservoirs in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins which may be used to meet future energy development needs.35 7
Two issues inhibit use of this water for energy purposes. The first concerns the states' authority to condition the use of water from federal
351. 43 U.S.C. § 615jj note (1976) (omitted from the Code as having limited applicability).
352. Price & Weatherford, supra note 349, at 124-28.
353. See supra text accompanying note 253.
354. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text. Indian tribes and Indian allottees are
restricted in their ability to convey any interest in real property unless authorized by Congress.
See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976). Over the years there have been acts permitting tribes and allottees to
lease their lands, the most comprehensive being the Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396, 415-415d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). This Act permits 25
year leases, for "public, religious, education, recreational, residential or business purposes." Id.
§ 1,69 Stat. 539, 539, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1976). The Act provides an option to renew for another 25
year period. Id.
The leasing of tribal mineral resources is governed by 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1976). The
authority of tribes to lease mineral resources would be considerably expanded by S. 1894, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), which was passed by the Senate on June 8, 1982, 128 CONG. Rnc. S7724
(daily ed. June 30, 1982), and by the House on Aug. 17, 1982, 128 CONG. REc. H6044-46 (daily ed.
Aug. 17, 1982). Leasing of mineral resources of Indian allottees is governed by 25 U.S.C. § 396
(1976).
Of course, non-Indian successors to allottees do not have any restrictions on their lands.
They have reserved rights, however, in the amount of water they actually used within a reasonable
time of their acquisition of title. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 245 & 262 and accompanying text. The energy companies would acquire
the reserved rights appurtenant to the lands vested in such successors.
356. See supra notes 238-49 & 264 and accompanying text.
357. GAO WATER REPORT, supra note 12, at 31-37.
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reclamation projects and the second deals with the federal govern-

ment's authority to contract reclamation waters for industrial uses.358
The three basic categories of law affecting distribution of water for
energy use f6bm government dams in the Upper Colorado and Upper

Missouri
Basins are the general reclamation laws, especially those of
1902, 359 1920,360 1939,361 1958,362 and 1963;363 the interstate river compacts; and the authorizing legislation for the specific projects.
A. Laws Affecting the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin

The basic interstate compact allocating the water of the Colorado
River is the Colorado River Compact,3 64 which includes Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. The interstate water allocation of the Upper Colorado River Basin states of

Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and Arizona (which is partly
in the Upper Basin and partly in the Lower Basin) is governed by the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.365
In addition, there is a continuing series of authorization and appropriation acts for constructing dams on the Colorado River. Among
the most important legislation authorizing construction on the Upper
Colorado River is the Colorado River Storage Act.366 These acts gen358. See id. at 34; LIQUID FUELS, supra note 2, at V-37 to V-38.
359. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at scattered sections of 43

U.S.C.).

360. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 86, 41 Stat. 451, 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1976).
361. Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, 53 Stat. 1187 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 375a, 387-389, 485-485k (1976)).
362. Water Supply Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-500, § 301, 72 Stat. 319, 319, amendedby Act
of July 20, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 10, 75 Stat. 210 (1961) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§ 390b (1976)).
363. Act of June 21, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-44, 77 Stat. 68, 43 U.S.C. § 485h note (1976).
364. The Colorado River Compact was authorized by Congress in 1921, Act of Aug. 19, 1921,
ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171, negotiated in 1922, approved by Congress in 1928 in § 13 of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 6171 (1976), and proclaimed by President Hoover on June 25,
1929, 46 Stat. 3000, after being ratified by six states. Arizona ratified it in 1944. See supra note 42.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact may be found at 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928) and 1 U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL RECLAMATION AND RELATED LAWS ANNOTATED 441-45
(1972).
365. See Act of Apr. 6, 1949, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 31-43. See supra note 348 for further information about the Compact.
The Lower Colorado Basin states of Arizona, California, and Nevada never entered into a
compact, and their water allocation is governed by the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 617-617t (1976), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963).
366. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976), which affects the Lower Colorado River and Colorado River Basin
Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (1968), 43 U.S.C. § 616aa note (1976) (omitted from
Code as having limited applicability).
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erally stipulate that they are subject to the Colorado River Compact
and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact,3 67 as well as the reclamation laws.368
B. Laws Affecting the Upper MissouriRiver Basin
The Upper Missouri River Basin, in contrast to the Upper Colo-

rado Basin, is not governed by any overall interstate compact. However, tributaries and water systems within the Basin may be so
governed. 369 The Missouri River Basin dams were built under the
Flood Control Act of 1944,370 pursuant to which the Army Corps of
Engineers is authorized to build dams which may be administered by
the Secretary of the Interior under the reclamation laws.37 '
C. Reclamation Laws

The foundation of federal reclamation law is the Reclamation Act
of 1902.372 Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 states: "Nothing

in [this Act] shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in
any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the
control, appropriation, use or distribution of water used in irrigation
....

Pursuant to this restriction, the federal government acquires

its water rights within the framework of state laws.3 74 When appropriating water rights by condemnation or inverse condemnation, the federal government is obligated to use state law to define those property
rights for which compensation must be paid.375 A series of cases
367. Eg., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617c, 617g (1976) (subject to Colorado
River Compact); Colorado River Storage Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620, 620f, 620h, 620m (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) (subject to both); Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, §§ 601(a),
602(b), 603(a), 82 Stat. 885, 899-901 (1968), 43 U.S.C. § 616aa note (1976) (subject to both).
368. E.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617m (1976); Colorado River Storage Act
§ 620c (1976); Colorado River Basin Project Act, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 604, 82 Stat. 885, 991
(1968), 43 U.S.C. § 616oo note (1976).
369. E.g., Yellowstone River Compact, ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663 (1950), among Montana, North
Dakota, and Wyoming.
370. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460d,
825s; 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-I, 701a-l, 701b-l, 701c note, 701f note, 701j note, 708, 709; 43 U.S.C. § 390
(1976)).
371. 43 U.S.C. § 390 (1976).
372. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified at scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
373. 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
374. See Sax, supra note 183, at 53 n.25 ("In fact the United States does make application to
state agencies for permits to appropriate, and does subject itself to state-law limitations on the
amount of water it can acquire.").
375. Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963), and Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963), were
twin cases involving inverse condemnation of waters by the Bureau of Reclamation. The Court,
in dealing with § 8, stated: "Rather, the effect of § 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the
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confirmed the federal government's view that section 8 merely requires
that state law be followed in appropriating water, but does not confine
the Bureau of Reclamation's control over the use or distribution of the
water.376
The Supreme Court cases of Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken3 7 7 and Fresno v. California378 dealt with specific provisions in
the reclamation laws, one of which prohibits acquisition of federal reclamation water for use on tracts exceeding 160 acres 37 9 and another
which requires that irrigation uses be preferred to municipal uses.38
These stipulations conflicted with state laws, and the claim was made
that pursuant to section 8, state law should govern. The Supreme
Court, however, stated that because of the mandatory nature of the
provisions restricting acreage and giving irrigation preference to municipal uses, state law need not be applied. However, the Court went
further in the Ivanhoe case, stating "As we read § 8, it merely requires
the United States to comply with state law when, in the construction
and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary for it to
acquire water rights or vested interests therein. But the acquisition of
water rights must not be confused with the operation of federal
projects." 38 ' The Fresno case contains similar dictum.382
Arizona v. Calfornia38 3 dealt with the apportionment of water in
the Lower Colorado River Basin among California, Nevada, and Arizona under the Boulder Canyon Project Act.3 84 Section 18 of that Act
contains a provision similar to section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act,
stating that the Boulder Canyon Project Act is not to be construed as
definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made." 372 U.S. at
630.
376. Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Ivanhoe
Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). For a contrary view which denounces the
"proprietary theory," see Sax, supra note 183, at 57-62.
377. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
378. 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
379. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976), see Id. § 423e. There are bills presently pending in Congress
which would increase this acreage limitation. H.R. 5539, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1867, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); see S. REP. No. 373, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). These two bills have been
incorporated into the first two titles of S. 1409, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-230, 128, CoNo. REc.
H7425-30 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1982); see H. REP. No. 97-885, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 CONG. REC.
H7425, H7432-34 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1982).
380. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976).
381. 357 U.S. at 291.
382. 372 U.S. at 630.
383. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
384. 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1976).
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interfering with state control of water.38 Section 14 of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act requires that the reclamation laws govern the management of the project. 386 These provisions notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court held that state law does not govern the terms of the
contracts made by the Interior Secretary pursuant to the Boulder Canyon Project Act, nor does it govern the parties with whom the Secretary
may make such contracts because of the authority reposed in the Secretary under section 5 of the Act. 387 The Court also relied on the Ivanhoe
of recand Fresno cases as precluding state control over the disposition
38 8
Act.
Reclamation
1902
the
of
8
section
under
water
lamation
The holding in Arizona has been subject to criticism on the
grounds that it dissolves the partnership between the federal government and the states on the Lower Colorado. It permits the Interior
Secretary to distribute water in times of shortage and to decide which
projects will receive water, regardless of the state's prior appropriation
law or preferences.38 9
The trend toward an increasingly free hand for the federal government was reversed in Caiffornia v. UnitedStates.3 9 ° In that case, California had sought to impose restrictions on the appropriation of water
by the Bureau of Reclamation. One restriction was that the Bureau
make firm commitments or specific plans for the use of the water. The
Supreme Court held that state law applied to the control, use, and distribution of water as well as its appropriation. Despite agreeing with
the holdings in Ivanhoe and Fresno that "explicit congressional directive[s] '' 39 t in reclamation laws or project authorizations take precedence over state law, the Court disavowed the dicta of Ivanhoe and
Fresno by holding that in the absence of such congressional directives,
state law applied. The application of state law was not to be confined
merely to the definition of property rights in water. The conditions of
the California permit would apply unless, on remand, the lower court
385. Id. § 617q.
386. Id. § 617m.
387. 373 U.S. at 587-90. Section 5 states: "The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, under
such general regulations as he may prescribe, to contract for the storage of water in said reservoir
43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976).
and for the delivery thereof. . . for irrigation and domestic uses.
388. 373 U.S. at 586-87.
389. Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 158, 190-96; see also Meyers, supra note 42, at 58-65 (discussing the

relationship between state and federal law).
390. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
391. Id. at 673.
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found that congressional directives precluded such restrictions. 92
The Supreme Court in Californiav. UnitedStates also affirmed but

limited the Arizona v. California holding. The Court agreed that the
Interior Secretary had been granted broad powers by the Boulder Canyon Project Act because the project was "a massive multistate reclama'
tion project."393
Therefore, the Court had been justified in Arizona v.
Calfornia when it created an exception to the general applicability of
state law to reclamation projects.394
The import of this ruling in California v. UnitedStates may largely

be limited to the Boulder Canyon Project, however, and may thus be
inapplicable to the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins. 395 Although the Colorado River Storage Act 396 and the Flood

Control Act of 1944197 authorize multistate projects, neither Act grants
powers to the Interior Secretary as broad as those granted by section 5
of the Boulder Canyon Project Act.398 On the other hand, the act authorizing the Navajo Indian Irrigation and the San Juan-Chama
Projects, 399 which amends the Colorado River Storage Act, does con-

tain broad language which restricts water use to contracts which are
satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior and in conformance with
the Navajo Irrigation and San Juan-Chama Projects Act. 400 However,
since the Projects are local ones which do not approach the extensive
water regulation contemplated in the Boulder Canyon Project, the
powers of the Interior Secretary may be construed as being more limited. Another distinguishing factor in the Boulder Canyon Project Act
is that it was enacted to settle conflicting claims of the Lower Colorado
River Basin states4°0 and could be expected to confer a considerable
amount of power on the Secretary of the Interior to apportion the
water. No interstate squabbles of a similar scale were involved in the
392. Id. at 679.
393. Id. at 674.
394. Id.
395. See Note, State Controloverthe Reclamation Waterhole Reality or Mirage?, 78 MicH. L.
REv. 227, 240-41 (1979).
396. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
397. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460d,

825s; 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-1, 701a-1, 701b-1, 701c note, 701f note, 701j note, 708, 709; 43 U.S.C. § 390
(1976)).
398. 43 U.S.C. § 617d (1976); see Sax, supra note 183, at 56.
399. Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 615ii-615yy
note, 620, 620a, 620d, 620f (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
400. Id., § 11, 76 Stat. 96, 99-100, 43 U.S.C. § 615ss note (1976).
401. See Meyers, supra note 42, at 38-42.
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authorization of the Upper Colorado Basin and Upper Missouri Basin
projects.
Although the California v. United States decision strengthens the
ability of states to plan for the management of their water resources,
the case confirms the Interior Secretary's authority to carry out federal
policies enumerated in congressional enactments, even when they conflict with state policies. The Court quoted the legislative history of the
1902 Reclamation Act to indicate that Congress intended to defer to
state law, except with regard to certain specific items such as the acreage limitation of 160 acres.40 2 Since that time, however, Congress has
added other restrictions regarding cultivation on project land4 0 3 and
has incorporated policies concerning environmental protection 4°4 and
surplus crops 405 within its reclamation enactments. Water availability
for energy development pursuant to state law will therefore be constrained by the preemptive effect of these policies.
Except for the Federal Power Act of 1920,406 which dealt with hydroelectric power, no energy related laws have been enacted that preempt state water authority. In FirstIowa Hydro-electric Cooperative v.
FPC, 4 0 7 the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not prevent the
federal licensing of a hydroelectric facility, notwithstanding a provision
in the Federal Power Act40 8 analogous to section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act4 9 reserving to the states the authority to control the use
4 11
and distribution of water.4 10 In Chemehuevi Tribe ofIndians v. FPC,
the Supreme Court limited the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Act to
hydroelectric facilities, reversing the court of appeals which had held
that the Federal Power Act covered thermal electric plants using surplus water from federal dams.4 12 One commentator noted prior to the
Supreme Court decision:
If the decision of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
should be sustained, it would seem to presage the conversion
of the FPC's hydro-electric project licensing authority to a
402. See 438 U.S. at 663-70 & nn.18-23.

403. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 440 (1976).
404. Eg., id. § 620g.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

Eg., id. § 620c.
16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
328 U.S. 152 (1945).
Section 27 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 821 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 383 (1976).
328 U.S. at 181-83.
420 U.S. 395 (1975).
Id. at 399-400, 424.
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charter to become a national water rights adjudicatory
agency. . . . It is conceivable that every time a thermal electric plant downstream from such a [federal] dam makes a diversion for cooling or other purposes, it may be utilizing
surplus water from a government dam . . . . The mischief
that imposing such adjudicatory functions on the FPC would
inject into already complex interrelationships between state
water 4rights
agencies and other federal agencies boggles the
13
mind.

Due to the Supreme Court's opinion, however, use of water for energy
development will continue to be governed by state policies, except in
the case of hydroelectric development, at least until Congress incorporates a national energy policy into its reclamation legislation.
D. Use of Waterfor IndustrialPurposes
1. Upper Missouri River Basin
InEnvironmentalDefense Fund,Inc. v. Morton,4 14 a federal district
court held that the Secretary of the Interior could market reclamation
water from the Yellowtail and Boysen Reservoirs in the Upper Missouri River Basin for industrial purposes. Section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 authorizes the Secretary "to enter into
contracts to furnish water for municipal water supply or miscellaneous
purposes. ' 415 The court held that industrial use is included within
either of the terms "municipal" or "miscellaneous. 41 6 The court cited
the Act of June 21, 1963, 4' 7 which authorizes the renewal of water contracts made under the 1939 Act for "municipal, domestic or industrial"
purposes, 418 as evidence that these purposes were contemplated by the
1939 Act.4 19 The court found that the 1939 Act requirement that "[n]o
contract relating to municipal water supply or miscellaneous purposes
shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary, it will not
impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes ' 42 had been
complied with by the compilation of an adequate record supporting the
413. Muys, supra note 58, at 343.
414. 420 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Mont. 1976), rey'd inpart on othergrounds & remanded, 596 F.2d

848 (9th Cir. 1979).
415. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976).
416. 420 F. Supp. at 1043.
417.
418.
419.
420.

Pub. L. No. 88-44, 77 Stat. 68, 43 U.S.C. 485h note (1976).
Id.
420 F. Supp. at 1043.
43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (1976).
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Secretary's decision. 421 The Flood Control Act of 1944422 and its legislative history were also cited to support the court's finding that the
dams built pursuant to the Act were to supply water for industrial
purposes.4 23
The district court was upheld on these issues by the Ninth Circuit,
although the case was remanded on other grounds.4 24 Although the
case has done much to clarify the issue, there remain obstacles to marketing water for energy purposes from the Missouri River federal
dams. Each of the possible reclamation acts under which industrial
water may be marketed, the Act of February 25, 1920,425 the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, and the Water Supply Act of 1958,426 contains
restrictions on such marketing. The 1920 Act requires that approval be
given by water user associations, and requires a showing of no other
"practicable source of water" for the industrial purpose.427 Furthermore, the delivery of such water cannot be detrimental to the irrigation
projects or to prior appropriators.4 2 The 1939 Act contains the requirement discussed in EnvironmentalDefense Fund,that the Secretary
of the Interior must find nonimpairment of irrigation before water is
sold for municipal or miscellaneous uses.429 The 1958 Act authorizes
the construction of storage for municipal or industrial water, but stipulates that modifications that would affect the original purposes of the
projects may not be made without congressional approval.43 °
2.

Upper Colorado River Basin

The situation in the Upper Colorado River Basin is somewhat
431
simpler, since the authorizing legislation for projects in the Basin
provides that although the reclamation laws apply to the projects, municipal water contracts may be made without regard to the nonimpairment provision of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939.432
421. 420 F. Supp. at 1045-46.
422. Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460d,
825s; 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-1, 701a-1, 701b-l, 701c note, 701f note, 701j note, 708, 709; 43 U.S.C. § 390
(1976)).
423. 420 F. Supp. at 1041-43.
424. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1979).
425. 43 U.S.C. § 521 (1976).
426. Id. § 390b(b).
427. Id. § 521.
428. Id.
429. Id. § 485h(c)(2).
430. Id. § 390b(d).
431. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-6200 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
432. Id. § 620c (1976).
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The EnvironmentalDefense Fund case did not deal with the issue

of state consent to federal marketing of industrial water and, presumably, after Calfornia v. United States, such consent would be required.
However, the states themselves in the Colorado River Basin may be
constrained by the Colorado River Compact in their use of water for
energy purposes.
Article III(e) 433 of the Compact states that the Upper Basin states
may not withhold water which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses, nor may the Lower Basin states require such
water. The Compact defines domestic use to exclude electrical power
generation.434 In addition, article IV(b) permits impounding and use of
water for electrical generation, but such use is made inferior to agricultural and domestic uses.4 35 One commentator has noted that eventu-

ally the case may arise where an agricultural user in the Lower Basin
sues a power plant in the Upper Basin to restrict its diversion of water
43 6
in order to provide more water for the superior downstream use.
V.

CONCLUSION

Traditionally, most water has been used for agricultural purposes
in the Rocky Mountain region. In the last twenty-five years, thermal
electric plants have withdrawn increasing amounts of water 437 and
other energy uses may also become significant. During this time, the
West became increasingly urbanized, which meant that more water was
required for municipal and industrial uses. Environmentalists became
concerned with the disruption of the fragile ecosystems in the area due
to increased water consumption, and therefore demanded legal mechanisms to require conservation of water. This overlay of new uses created a strain on the traditional legal structure which had been designed
to accommodate agricultural uses.
As resource allocation and energy and environmental concerns
came to be increasingly viewed as national issues, the federal government attempted to expand its control over water resources, in the absence of explicit congressional policy, by a process of creative judicial
and bureaucratic rulemaking. Balance has been restored to some ex433. Colorado River Compact, art. III(e), reprintedin 70 CONG. REC. 324, 325 (1928).
434. Id. art. 11(h), reprintedin 70 CONo. REC. 324, 325 (1928).
435. Id. art. IV(b), reprintedin 70 CONG. REc. 324, 325 (1928).
436. Weatherford & Jacoby, Impact ofEnergy Development on the Law of the ColoradoRiver,
15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 171, 197-98 (1975).
437. Id. at 172.
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tent between the federal and state governments by Supreme Court decisions. Indian rights, however, still remain confused and may have
suffered from the attempts of the federal government to piggyback its
water claims on doctrines formulated on behalf of Indian tribes.
This Article has dealt with two problems. The first is how to define the quantum of water which the federal government, state governments, and Indian tribes control. Commentators have pointed out that
concepts of "ownership" are not of much use in this context.4 3 8 For
example, a state claiming ownership of water is merely using legal
shorthand to claim sovereignty over the water to enact laws to either
adjudicate the rights of its citizens to water, reserve it for state governmental purposes, or conserve it for future generations. The federal and
Indian exercise of sovereignty over water appropriated pursuant to the
federal law of reserved rights is more limited than the exercise of state
sovereignty over waters, although arguably the discretion of Indian
tribes in the exercise of their sovereignty over such appropriated water
should be greater than that of the federal government. The attempt to
found federal and Indian claims to water on federal "ownership" of the
public domain ultimately rests upon the discredited notion of the common law as a transcendent system of property rights to be respected by
the courts or legislatures. 439 Legal systems are now recognized to be
whatever the sovereign enacts as law pursuant to the United States
Constitution. Congress has never enacted legislation mandating common law riparian rights in the West.
The second problem dealt with in this Article concerns the funda438. Eg., Trelease, Government Ownership andTrusteeshp of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 638,
638-39 (1957).
439. See supra note 129. Before the emergence of "legal realism" in this century, the traditional common law view was "an embodiment of right reason, possessed of transcendent and
immutable validity, a kind of secularized and nationalized continuation of the religious and cosmopolitan natural law tradition of the Middle Ages." Holland, The Legacy of Constitutionaiisn"
The Lochner Era Reconsidered, AM. SPECTATOR Jan. 1982, at 14, 17. Some judges of the last
century would naturally view common law riparian rights as applying to the federal domain in the
absence of other congressional enactments.
Yet this dogmatic view of the common law has been discredited, in part, by a book written by
Justice Holmes. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1963). Justice Holmes was also the author
of Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339 (1909), in which state prior appropriation
law was recognized as controlling without reference to any congressional enactment permitting
states to so change the common law. In that opinion, Justice Holmes emphasized that the prior
appropriation doctrine is better suited to the economic necessities of arid lands than is the English
riparian law doctrine. Id. at 345. The implication of Boquillas would seem to conform'to Professor Trelease's assertion that "the state laws have validity not because of an act of Congress but
because of the 'silent acquiescence' of the federal government" in not preempting traditional state
jurisdiction over water. WATER STUDY No. 5, supra note 47, at 147h.
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mental fact that water flows between the lands of the various sovereign
entities in the West. This creates conflicts when one sovereign exerts
rights over its quantum of water which flows through the lands of another sovereign. Until now, of course, this has been resolved by cases
applying federal law." 0 However, such piecemeal adjudication is unwieldy, time consuming, and susceptible to multiple procedural obstructions. It is to be hoped that the rationalization of water uses may
be hastened by good faith negotiations between the parties, particularly
between the states and the Indian tribes. Once such rationalization occurs, energy development consistent with environmental safeguards
may proceed within a coherent legal framework.
440. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). In these cases, the
Supreme Court applied federal law to the apportionment of water between the states. In one
sense, the Indian reserved rights doctrine is also a component of this body of federal common law,
because it is an application of federal law to resolve conflicting claims of sovereignty, albeit not
between states, but between states and Indian tribes.
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